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ABSTRACT 
 
Giving and Thanksgiving: Gratitude and Adiaphora in A Mask and Paradise Regained. 
(August 2011) 
Julie Nicole Newberry, B.A., Biola University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nandra Perry 
 
John Milton begins his Second Defence of the English People by stressing the 
universal importance of gratitude: ―In the whole life and estate of man the first duty is to 
be grateful to God.‖ Peter Medine has shown the prominence of gratitude in Paradise 
Lost, but scholars have not fully appreciated the role of this virtue elsewhere in Milton‘s 
writing. This thesis is an attempt to redress that oversight with reference to A Mask and 
Paradise Regained, while also answering a question that Medine raises but does not 
satisfactorily resolve: Why gratitude? Both texts have been read as responses to the early 
modern debate about the doctrine of things indifferent, or adiaphora, and I argue that 
this context helps explain Milton‘s interest in gratitude. The first section of this thesis 
accordingly reviews the historical and theological context of the adiaphora controversy, 
while the second examines Milton‘s more direct treatment of things indifferent and 
gratitude, primarily in De Doctrina Christiana. In the remaining sections, historical and 
literary analysis of A Mask and Paradise Regained illuminates how Milton addresses 
tensions in the doctrine of things indifferent by emphasizing gratitude.  
 iv 
Of the commonly recognized criteria for directing the use of adiaphora—the rule 
of faith, the rule of charity, and the glorification of God, often through gratitude—
gratitude toward God frequently receives less thorough attention, yet Milton gives it a 
prominent role in A Mask and allows it to overshadow the other guidelines in Paradise 
Regained. Although gratitude is itself sometimes subject to manipulation in these texts, 
both A Mask and Paradise Regained suggest that the requirement of God-ward gratitude 
can serve as a check against subtle distortions of the other guidelines. The effectiveness 
of this strategy stems from the fact that the vices gratitude guards against—self-
indulgent ingratitude, stoical ingratitude, and idolatry—are the vices that underlie 
licentiousness and superstition, the primary abuses of the doctrine of things indifferent. 
Milton‘s privileging of gratitude thus provides a way of cross-checking appeals to the 
more contested criteria of faith and love, protecting the doctrine of things indifferent 
from perversions that would undermine Christian liberty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: MILTON AND GRATITUDE 
 
Physical and familial trials notwithstanding, Milton foregrounds gratitude in the 
opening lines of his Second Defence of the English People (1654), portraying it as a 
virtue of universal importance: ―In the whole life and estate of man the first duty is to be 
grateful to God and mindful of his blessings‖ (qtd. in Medine 117; Fenton 165). Despite 
additional, political trials after the Restoration, Milton also assigns an important role to 
gratitude in his epics, as Peter Medine argues with reference to Paradise Lost.
1
 Gratitude 
has been largely overlooked in Milton‘s other literary texts, but its place in A Mask and 
Paradise Regained attests to a life-long engagement with this virtue, further confirmed 
by its multiple appearances in De Doctrina Christiana. Clearly, as Medine comments, 
Milton has a ―remarkable . . . fascination‖ with gratitude (119)—but why?  
At least in the case of A Mask (1634) and Paradise Regained (1671), Milton‘s 
interest in this virtue appears to be bound up with his concern for the highly contentious 
doctrine of things indifferent, or adiaphora. Of the commonly recognized criteria for  
 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of the MLA Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly Writing, 3
rd
 edition.  
1
 To my knowledge, Medine‘s is the only extensive study of the role of gratitude and ingratitude in any of 
Milton‘s longer texts, but others have recognized the issue in passing. For example, Fenton discusses 
gratitude and Satan‘s ingratitude in the context of land rights (164-65), and she notes that, in Book 11 of 
Paradise Lost, ―Michael reminds Adam that with possession of the ‗gift‘ comes the duty to recognize the 
value of the gift, which in turn should incite gratitude‖ (171, 170). Schwartz also comments, ―Gratitude for 
the bounty of Paradise comprises the heart of the liturgy an Adam and Eve‘s evening prayer‖ (46), and her 
observations on charity and scarcity as interpretive principles are relevant to the opposition of gratitude 
and ingratitude (45-50, passim). Kean makes passing reference to the importance of ―thanksgiving for [the 
Lord‘s] many gifts‖ in her discussion of Jesus‘s allusions to Deuteronomy in Paradise Regained (439). 
Kean also notes that an ―angelic song of thanksgiving‖ connects with several other Miltonic texts (433). 
 2 
directing the use of adiaphora—the rule of faith, the rule of charity, and the glorification 
of God, often through gratitude—gratitude toward God frequently receives less thorough 
attention, yet Milton gives it a prominent role in A Mask and allows it to overshadow the 
other guidelines in Paradise Regained. Although gratitude is itself sometimes subject to 
manipulation in these texts, both A Mask and Paradise Regained suggest that the 
requirement of God-ward gratitude can serve as a check against subtle distortions of the 
other guidelines. As will be seen, the reason this strategy works so well is that the very 
vices that gratitude guards against—self-indulgent ingratitude, stoical ingratitude, and 
idolatry—are the vices that underlie licentiousness and superstition, the primary abuses 
of the doctrine of things indifferent. Milton‘s privileging of gratitude thus provides a 
way of cross-checking appeals to the more contested criteria of faith and love, helping to 
protect the doctrine of things indifferent from perversions that would undermine 
Christian liberty. 
 3 
2. ADIAPHORISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 
2.1 Introduction 
Before turning to A Mask and Paradise Regained, reviewing the adiaphora 
debate in early modern England will help to contextualize Milton‘s treatment of the 
standard criteria for using things indifferent. At its simplest, the doctrine of things 
indifferent states that there are some things (objects, beliefs, or behaviors) that, in 
themselves, are neither good nor bad.
2
 As a subcategory of the doctrine of Christian 
liberty (Calvin 3.19; Milton, De Doctrina 537), the doctrine of things indifferent has 
obvious appeal for Milton. In the form he adopts, adiaphorism privileges individual 
conscience over external forms of authority, and in any form, it seeks to prevent both 
superstition and licentiousness, recurring concerns in Milton‘s work. However, the 
interpretation and application of this doctrine remained highly contested in early modern 
England, and Milton‘s literary treatments of adiaphorism can be best understood as a 
response to this controversy.  
Historically, adiaphorism has taken several forms, but its particular shape in early 
modern England reflects the double origins of this doctrine in Greek philosophy and 
Christian theology. According to Bernard J. Verkamp, the doctrine of things indifferent 
finds its earliest expression in the teachings of the Cynics and Stoics (20-21, cf. Fish, 
How Milton 365).
3
 Because the Cynics ―interioriz[ed] ‗virtue‘ or ‗right reason‘ to the 
                                                 
2
 Several scholars make this point; see, for example, Kahn (―Revising‖ 540-41; cf. ―Allegory‖ 129), and 
Verkamp (passim).  
3
 It may not be coincidental that these the only two philosophical schools explicitly mentioned in both A 
Mask (lines 707-08) and that Satan offers Stoicism as a particularly crafty temptation in Paradise 
Regained (4.280), as will be discussed below. 
 4 
point of almost total identity with the self,‖ they viewed everything outside the self as 
―ha[ving] neither value nor disvalue‖ and accordingly ―designated . . . all externals‖ as 
―adiaphora, or literally, ‗things that make no difference‘‖ (Verkamp 20-21). In contrast, 
the Stoics did not believe that ―adiaphora were altogether lacking in value or 
disvalue‖—only that a person‘s ―interior disposition‖ in using a given thing would 
override any inherent value or disvalue (Verkamp 21). Thus, ―the adiaphoron was a 
thing or action which when considered in itself—i.e., according to its nature—could 
become either good or evil‖ (21).4 In its Christian form, adiaphorism has traditionally 
been more limited in scope (Verkamp 22-23; cf. Fish, How Milton 365-66). The word 
―adiaphora‖ is absent from the Bible, but early Christian theologians such as Origin and 
Clement of Alexandria borrowed the term to explain New Testament passages ―about 
the Christian‘s freedom of choice regarding food, drinks, and similar matters‖ (Verkamp 
25, 22).  
Though it was clearly no new doctrine, adiaphorism became newly relevant for 
reformers, in England and elsewhere, who needed a guide for navigating the conflicts 
that arose with the Reformation (Verkamp 14-15). In fact, Verkamp argues that the 
doctrine of things indifferent ―lie[s] at the very center of [early reformers‘] thinking, 
profoundly affecting almost every move they made‖ (xv). The practical ramifications of 
this doctrine vary, however, depending on how one defines things indifferent. Some 
                                                 
4
 I depart here from Fish‘s summary of the classical origins of adiaphorism. Although he references 
Verkamp‘s study, Fish appears to inadvertently conflate the Cynic and Stoic position: 
The first and stronger version [of adiaphorism] originates with the Stoics, who identify 
virtue with the self and believe that self to be sufficient. Consequently all things acquire 
value only in relation to an inner disposition or intention. Thus, the entire external world 
of the stoics is a mass of adiaphora, which, depending on the circumstances, ‗could 
become either good or evil.‘‖ (How Milton 365).  
 5 
radical reformers deemed ―indifferent‖ only those things specifically permitted by 
Scripture, while a more moderate group held that ―positive accord with the general 
directions of Scripture‖ would suffice to make a thing indifferent (Verkamp 76, 
passim).
5
 Still others maintained that anything not commanded or forbidden by Scripture 
was thereby indifferent, so that only the use of adiaphora (not their status as adiaphora) 
was dictated by general Scriptural principles (Verkamp 76, passim). Taking this view, 
the Canons of 1640 describe adiaphora as something ―of its own nature indifferent, 
neither commanded nor condemned by the Word of God, either expressly, or by 
immediate deduction‖ (qtd. in Caldwell 97; cf. Shagan 505; Verkamp 76-77).  
For all three of these positions, indifference is determined, in one way or another, 
by what the Bible does or does not say. However, a few adiaphorists relied more on 
philosophical categories for their definition of indifference. William Bradshaw, for 
instance, interprets indifference as a mean position between extremes in A Treatise of the 
Nature and Use of Things Indifferent (1608) (1-4, 11; cf. Fullwood 1, 30). This approach 
is complicated with regard to moral indifference, though; evil would need to exist in 
order for it to be one of the extremes between which morally indifferent things lie, but 
many early moderns deny the positive existence of evil (Bradshaw11; Brooke 21). In his 
Discourse on Opening the Nature of Episcopacy (1641),
6
 Robert Greville, Lord Brooke 
resolves this difficulty by claiming that things are indifferent only in the human mind:  
                                                 
5
 Verkamp comments that, in practice, the more moderate often gave the ―general directives of Scripture‖ 
such a ―narrow interpretation‖ that they ―in effect recognized no wider a realm of adiaphora than did the 
strict biblical reductionists‖ (Verkamp 76, cf. 70-71). 
6
 Caldwell note that Milton praises this text in Areopagitica for its temperate call for tolerance of non-
conformists (Caldwell 102-03). 
 6 
all the Indifference (in the world) lyes in our Understandings, and the 
Darknesse thereof (which makes them wavering sometimes, and doubtfull 
whether to doe or not, so that in Them seemes some Indifference to either 
extreme) but there is none in the things themselves, or Actions; which are 
still either unlawfull, or necessary (if Lawfull, at this time in these 
Circumstances;) never Indifferent in Themselves. (29; cf. Caldwell 106)  
Things are merely called indifferent because of their ―seeming equality of Use,‖ but in 
fact one of two options will always be better, and one is morally obligated to choose the 
best (Brooke 22, 23-25; cf. Caldwell 105). Since an individual might fail to see the moral 
quality of any particular thing or action, Brooke‘s view leads to the conclusion that 
everything is (at least potentially) indifferent for this or that person—even though 
nothing is actually indifferent, in itself.
7
  
Whatever ―things‖ are counted as indifferent—whether this includes everything 
or only those things permitted or left unregulated by Scripture—most writers agree that 
adiaphora retain their indifference only when ―[c]onsidered nakedly without respect to 
such Circumstances as change their property, and denominate them good or evil‖ 
                                                 
7
 Brooke‘s views are often cited in studies of Milton‘s adiaphorism, presumably because Milton‘s 
internalization of Scripture also leads to a version of adiaphorism that encompasses everything and 
emphasizes the convictions of individuals. However, these similarities should not obscure significant 
differences in Brooke‘s and Milton‘s view of things indifferent. Milton‘s adiaphorism will be discussed at 
length below, but it is worth pointing out a few distinctions at this point. Milton bases his adiaphorism on 
his understanding of the doctrine of Christian liberty, not on philosophical concerns about the nature of 
evil. Moreover, contrary to what is sometimes implied, Milton‘s adiaphorism does not lead to the 
conclusion that one is morally obligated to discover and choose the (one and only) best option in every 
case, as is required in Brooke‘s more philosophical brand of adiaphorism. As will be seen, I differ in this 
point from Fish‘s reading of Milton‘s adiaphorism. See also Caldwell (102-07), Kahn (―Revising‖ 545-
47), and Fish (How Milton 368) for a discussion of Brook‘s view; Kahn also treats Bradshaw‘s position 
(Machiavellian 143, 145; ―Revising‖ 526). 
 7 
(Fullwood 2).
8
 As John Tombes puts it in Christs Commination against Scandalizers 
(1641), ―many‖—and some would say all—―actions of men in the generall, . . . 
considered without restraint of particularizing circumstances afore they are . . .  actually 
done are indifferent‖ (174). However, Tombes adds, ―all humane actions . . . in the 
particular or singular, that flowe from deliberate reason are either morally good, or evill, 
as agreeing to, or dis[a]greeing from Gods law‖ (Tombes 174).9 By ―all,‖ Tombes means 
all, everything done intentionally (―from deliberate reason‖) (174). Even actions as 
seemingly neutral as ―every act of eating, or wearing apparel, or going a journey with 
this or that intent, in this or that manner‖ are always morally charged in practice 
(Tombes 176); one or more of the clear commands or general principles from Scripture 
will apply to any particular context of use.  
2.2 Authority and Adiaphora 
As Tombes‘s comment indicates, the doctrine of things indifferent can be applied 
to the use of any indifferent thing—a broad approach that Milton takes up in Paradise 
Regained and in several of his political prose texts.
10
 In early modern England, though, 
                                                 
8
 See also Tombes (172). There is some difference of opinion as to whether any circumstances or only 
some sorts of circumstances will render an adiaphora no longer indifferent in practice, but this distinction 
is not crucial for the present study. See Fish (How Milton 368); Kahn (―Revising‖ 543). Since it is 
generally agreed that Milton took an expansive view, according to an adiaphoron loses its indifference 
under any particular circumstances of use, I will focus my analysis on this brand of adiaphorism.  
9
Similarly, Brooke argues that the proper use of things indifferent must be determined by ‗every Morall 
circumstance, of time, place, &c. [must] rightly concurre‘‖ (qtd. in Caldwell 105). On a related note, 
William Bradshaw claims that nothing can be so ―absolutely Indifferent . . . but by some circumstaunce of 
time, place, person, use: it may be either very good, or very evill‖ (Bradshaw 16, marginal note b; qtd. in 
Kahn, ―Revising‖ 546; cf. Fish, How Milton 366-68). Writing in 1641, Tombes reports that a few writers 
had actually espoused the view that ―there is nothing indifferent‖ ever or at all, but such extreme claims 
―either hath beene retracted by the author, or conceive so absurd that it hath had either none of very few 
followers‖ (Tombes 173). 
10
 For instance, Stanley Fish argues that Milton‘s Apology portrays literary style as a thing indifferent, to 
be governed by the Christian‘s internal sense of what is charitable—even if the result may seem, ―by 
conventional standards, ‗not so mannerly to use‘‖ (Fish, How Milton 136, 135). In a famous passage of 
 8 
debates about this doctrine frequently centered on ecclesiastical questions about issues 
such as the use of ceremonies in worship (Verkamp 36) or the regulation of recreation on 
Sabbaths and religious holidays—a category of adiaphora that Milton addresses in A 
Mask (Marcus, Politics 169-212).
11
 The controversial nature of ecclesiastical control 
over things indifferent is conveniently illustrated by the instability of Article 20 in the 
Thirty-Nine Articles. At the beginning of Elizabeth I‘s reign, Article 20 merely required 
the church to ―not ordain anything ‗contrary to God‘s word written‘‖ (Caldwell 99). By 
1571, this had become a ―positive law‖ (Caldwell 99), stating that ―the Church‖ had 
―power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith‖ (Article 20, 
qtd. in Caldwell 99). Caldwell comments that ―this alteration in the article mysteriously 
appeared and vanished from the printed page throughout the reign of Elizabeth‖ (99), 
                                                                                                                                                
Areopagitica (1644), Milton invokes the doctrine of things indifferent to account for Truth‘s various 
appearances and to encourage tolerance regarding the use of a wide range of adiaphora:  
Yet is it not impossible that [Truth] may have more shapes than one. What else is all that 
rank of things indifferent, wherein Truth may be on this side, or on the other, without 
being unlike herself. What . . .  great purchase is this Christian liberty, which Paul so 
often boasts of. His doctrine is, that he who eats or eats not, regards a day, or regards it 
not, may doe either to the Lord. How many other things might be tolerated in peace, and 
left to conscience, had we but charity, and were it not the chief strong hold of our 
hypocrisie to be ever judging one another. I fear yet this iron yoke of outward 
conformity hath left a slavish print upon our necks . . . (Milton, Areopagitica 1022).  
This particular passage touches on many key issues in the general adiaphora debate, but Fish argues that 
Areopagitica as a whole also applies the concept of indifference specifically ―to the act of reading,‖ so that 
―books become things indifferent, neither good nor bad in themselves, but good or bad depending on 
whether they are well or ill used‖ (Fish, How Milton 368, 195-203). Kahn makes a similar argument 
(Machiavellian 174). Another example of writing on adiaphora that extends its focus beyond 
ecclesiastical controversies is the future James I‘s Basilikon Doron (1599). In the third book of this text, 
James offers his son guidelines for the kingly use of ―indifferent things‖—by which he means all sorts of 
earthly goods, from food to recreation (121). Kahn discusses Basilikon Doron from a rhetorical 
perspective (Machiavellian 142-43; ―Revising‖ 544, n35), but contrary to the impression that her study 
might give, James‘s focus seems to be more on a king‘s own use of adiaphora, rather than his authority 
over how his subjects use things indifferent.  
11
  Of course, several of Milton‘s political prose texts also address various aspects of the ecclesiastical 
adiaphora controversy. Of Reformation (1641) is an obvious example; Kahn has also noted references to 
things indifferent in A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes (1659) (Machiavellian 181). 
 9 
suggesting that the regulation of the use of things indifferent remained a highly contested 
issue.  
In part, the intensity of the debate reflects the fact that adiaphorism raises 
questions with important implications for political and ecclesiastical authority and for 
individual Christians‘ liberty12—questions such as: Who has the right to decide which 
things are not governed by Scripture or what course of action is required by present 
circumstances? What are the biblical standards that should be used to guide the use of 
adiaphora? How (and by whom) should these standards be interpreted and applied?
13
 
Intensifying the debate, writers on both sides of the adiaphora controversy express 
anxiety that giving the wrong answers to these questions may cause spiritual, 
ecclesiastical, and political harm to individuals, the nation, and the church.
14
  
At the heart of the debate is the question of what individuals should do if they 
cannot in good conscience comply with royal or ecclesiastical mandates requiring the 
use (or non-use) of adiaphora. Freedom in the use of things indifferent is generally 
                                                 
12
 In a sense, the debate regarding adiaphora in the church is a contest between competing authorities, 
with contenders including individual conscience, right reason, royal mandates, and ecclesiastical hierarchy 
and tradition. To cite a few examples of suggested authorities: Fullwood, referencing Clapham, suggests 
that adiaphora should be used in accord with general Biblical rules and ―Christian Reason‖ (Fullwood 
31); Tombes mentions Scripture, reason (167), and ―true prudence‖ (168). On Brooke‘s appeal to ―right 
reason,‖ see Caldwell (104, passim) and Kahn (―Revising‖ 546). Bagshaw (2) and Tombes (168) both cite 
prudence as necessary for the application of general Scriptural principles to particular circumstances. The 
relative authority of civil and ecclesiastical authorities is discussed by Verkamp (41-42, 143-44, 168, 
passim), Kahn (Machiavellian, passim), Clark (23-24, 24 marginal note a, 34-35), and Calvin (3.19.15). 
See also Kahn (―Allegory‖ 129; ―Revising‖ 543-44), Fish (How Milton 367, passim), and Caldwell 
(passim).  
13
 One or more of these and related questions have been raised by scholars such as Verkamp (61; cf. 29); 
Kahn (―Revising‖ 548); Shagan (506). 
14
 As Kahn observes, ―[t]he doctrine [of things indifferent] is . . . a touchstone in Tudor-Stuart discussions 
of sovereignty, royal prerogative, and freedom of conscience,‖ among other issues (Kahn, ―Allegory‖ 129; 
Machiavellian 144). Caldwell also argues that adiaphorism might provoke crises in moral epistemology 
(101) and with regard to ―the validity of man-made moral law‖ (97). 
 10 
recognized to be but one part of the broader doctrine of Christian liberty (Calvin 3.19),
15
 
and pro-conformist writers could use adiaphorism‘s relative unimportance as leverage—
as when John Racster privileges obedience to authorities over what is, after all, ―the last 
and leaste of all‖ the components of Christian liberty (55). According to some, as long as 
Christians retained internal awareness of their liberty, they could obediently conform to 
regulations covering things indifferent, without thereby endangering their Christian 
liberty (Calvin 3.19.9-10, 4.10.31).
16
 For others, however, quite the opposite is true. In 
fact, Edward Bagshaw argues, in The Great Question regarding Things Indifferent in 
Religious Worship (1660), that adiaphora may be used only if they are not required. 
Once ceremonies become ―Necessary, then the thing so imposed presently loses not its 
Liberty only, but likewise its Lawfulness,‖ lest Christian liberty be subverted (Bagshaw 
10).
17
 With some adiaphorists advocating complete external obedience and others calling 
for a rejection of regulations covering things indifferent, it is easy to see how the 
adiaphora controversy could leave pious individuals in a moral quandary.   
                                                 
15
 In Calvin‘s discussion of Christian liberty, for example, the use of adiaphora comes after two other, 
more theologically crucial expressions of freedom in Christ: the believer‘s freedom from the obligation to 
earn righteousness through the law and the believer‘s freedom to willingly obey God, with filial rather than 
servile obedience (3.19; cf. Kahn, ―Revising‖ 540-41). Milton‘s description of Christian liberty in De 
Doctrina also includes much more than freedom in the use of things indifferent (De Doctrina 535). 
16
 Clark also reports this view, though he rejects it (20-21). It should be noted that Calvin offers arguments 
for both sides of this debate. Internalizing the essence of Christian liberty, Calvin argues that as long as 
Christians have a firm understanding of the fact that they are free to use or not use indifferent things, their 
freedom is not imperiled even if they in fact do not use a given adiaphoron (3.19.10). However, Calvin 
concedes that ―it is sometimes also of consequence that we should assert our liberty before men‖ 
(3.19.10). 
17
 To cite a somewhat later example, in Of Scandal (1680), Samuel Clark argues that ―Christian Liberty 
extends to the Practice‖ (21); whether or not the believer retains an internal conviction of his or her 
Christian liberty, this liberty is threatened when the use of adiaphora is regulated without any sound 
biblical reason (Clark 22-23, cf. 53-55). 
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Lord Brooke offers a more moderate position, but it, too, can lead to moral 
crises.
18
 Based on his subjective conception of indifference (29), discussed above, 
Brooke does not believe that the church can actually make anything indifferent for 
anyone (30). Nevertheless, he grants that the church can decide the question of which of 
two alternatives is best, at least in cases that are generally considered indifferent (30-
31).
19
 Brooke predicts that it will usually be possible to reach agreement if everyone 
simply follows his plan to let ―right reason‖ be their guide, but he also recognizes the 
possibility of enduring scruples (32). He advises  individuals who disagree with the 
church‘s decision in such matters not to cause a schism, but Brooke also instructs them 
to refrain from performing active obedience until (or unless) right reason guides them to 
the church‘s conclusion (32). In fact, he states that acting without the authorization of 
right reason would automatically be sinful (32, 26-27). Taken to extremes, this fairly 
conciliatory approach to conflict between the church and individual conscience could 
inadvertently lead to immobilizing indecision for individual believers—much like what 
the Lady experiences in A Mask. 
2.3 Adiaphora Abused: Superstition, License, and Idolatry 
Indeed, on all sides of this controversy, the debate is partly fueled by fear. 
Christians who fail to properly understand and apply the doctrine of things indifferent 
are susceptible to the twin perils of superstition and licentiousness in their use of 
adiaphora (Calvin 3.19; cf. Kahn, ―Revising‖ 541-42). Moreover, both superstition and 
                                                 
18
 See Caldwell for an analysis of the implications of adiaphorism for moral epistemology, including with 
particular reference to Brooke‘s position (passim). 
19
 Brooke clarifies that when he allocates this authority to the church, he refers to all members of the 
church—not particular individuals in the church hierarchy (Brooke 32). 
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license can lead to the further sin of idolatry. Properly understood, the doctrine of things 
indifferent should prevent these vices, but each side of the debate worried that its 
opponents‘ position would lead to one or more forms of abuse in the use of adiaphora. 
If Christians eager to obey authorities fail to recognize and embrace their 
freedom in things indifferent, for instance, they may use (or not use) them as if doing so 
were necessary—a mistake, Francs Fullwood says, ―which Divines assert  to be 
Superstition‖ (46; cf. Shagan 506; Fish, How Milton, passim). This sort of abuse of 
things indifferent is a particularly pressing concern when it comes to ceremonies still 
associated with pre-Reformation worship practices (Verkamp 163; cf. Calvin 4.10.32). 
Accordingly, Bagshaw writes that it is ―utterly unlawfull for any Christian Magistrate to 
require the use of‖ ceremonies that, though they would usually be indifferent, have 
become tainted with superstition through custom (2). 
Beneath such objections to particular ceremonies, however, there lies a deeper 
fear that accepting the imposition of one ―necessary‖ ceremony will lead down a 
slippery slope to more pervasive superstition. As Calvin explains,  
when once the conscience is entangled in the net, it enters a long and 
inextricable labyrinth, from which it is afterwards most difficult to 
escape. When a man begins to doubt whether it is lawful for him to use 
linen for sheets, shirts, napkins, and handkerchiefs, he will not long be 
secure as to hemp, and will at last have doubts as to tow; for he will 
revolve in his mind whether he cannot sup without napkins, or dispense 
with handkerchiefs. Should he deem a daintier food unlawful, he will 
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afterwards feel uneasy for using loafbread and common eatables, because 
he will think that his body might possibly be supported on a still meaner 
food. . . . In fine, he will come to this, that he will deem it criminal to 
trample on a straw lying in his way. (3.19.7) 
Such incessant self-questioning shackles the believer, recalling the Lady‘s fettered state 
in A Mask (line 819). As long as superstitious beliefs govern the use of adiaphora, there 
can be no experience of Christian liberty because, as Calvin writes, ―[w]hen men are 
involved in such doubts whatever be the direction in which they turn, every thing they 
see must offend their conscience‖ (3.19.7).20  
Superstition regarding things indifferent takes several forms and often leads to 
additional forms of abuse. It can be either active or passive; as Fish points out, Milton is 
deeply concerned with the two-fold ―danger of too narrowly identifying the proper 
stance either with an action one must perform or with an action from which one must 
refrain‖ (Fish, How Milton 132-33, 192). Both sorts of superstition can devolve into 
theological despair and/or the frustrated rejection of all restraint, transforming 
superstition into license (cf. Calvin 3.19.7). Superstition also foments idolatry, as 
humans seek to control their circumstances through the use or non-use of external forms, 
rather than trusting God to give them good things. As will be seen, the danger of 
                                                 
20
 Of course, the blame does not lie wholly on the superstitious believer who stumbles over rules 
governing things indifferent. The authorities whose commands provoke such idolatrous superstition are 
severely criticized by writers such as Tombes. In his view, these authority figures ―put on [Christians‘] 
neckes that yoake that Christ hath freed us from‖ (Tombes 178)—a freedom purchased, Calvin points out, 
at a no less a price than Christ‘s own death (Calvin 3.19.14). Milton makes similarly severe comments 
about those who restrict Christian liberty: So closely linked are the gospel and Christian liberty that ―[i]f a 
magistrate takes this freedom away he takes the gospel away too‖ (De Doctrina 541). Since ―[e]very 
believer is ruled by the Spirit of God,‖ imposing upon a believer‘s liberty, ―whether . . . in the name of the 
church or of a Christian magistrate,‖ in effect ―plac[es] a yoke not only upon man but upon the Holy Spirit 
itself‖ (Milton, De Doctrina 590). 
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superstition and its byproducts plays a key role in the actions (and inaction) of Milton‘s 
characters in both A Mask and Paradise Regained (cf. Fish, How Milton, passim).
21
  
Of course, the opposite threat is that Christians will erroneously think they have a 
free pass to ―licentiously abuse the good gifts of God‖ (Calvin 3.19.9; cf. Kahn 
―Revising‖ 541). Defenders of the regulation of adiaphora feared that allowing 
individual freedom in the use of things indifferent would lead to licentiousness and even 
antinomianism.
22
 Furthermore, this form of abuse also leads to idolatry, whether through 
the tacit worship of indifferent things or through an idolatrous devotion to their apparent, 
non-divine source. Either form of licentious idolatry is dehumanizing and enslaving, as 
Milton‘s Mask makes particularly clear.  
2.4 Criteria for the Proper Use of Adiaphora: Faith, Love, and Gratitude  
Hedged in by superstition on the one side and  licentiousness on the other (cf. 
Shagan 506), how are Christians to navigate the use of things indifferent?  Moral 
dilemmas resulting from the doctrine of things indifferent can become quite complex, as 
evident in the careful treatment of cases of conscience in texts such as Fullwood‘s Some 
Necessary and Seasonable Cases of Conscience about Things Indifferent in Matters of 
Religion (1661). To help with discernment—and justify their own conclusions—
contributors to the adiaphora debate often offer criteria for the proper use of things 
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 Milton discusses what might be called superstition in terms of idolatry in Of Reformation, complaining 
of ―the new-vomited Paganisme‖ in church services ―of sensuall Idolatry, attributing purity, or impurity, to 
things indifferent‖ (876).  
22
 See Fish (How Milton 353-4), Kahn (―Revising‖ 541; Machiavellian 136, 289), and Verkamp (115-16, 
125, passim). 
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indifferent. Although their lists vary in specific content and length,
23
 the principles they 
expound can generally be reduced to three main standards, each of them derived from 
relevant biblical passages: Christians‘ use of things indifferent should glorify God, show 
love to their neighbors, and be an expression of their own faith and clear conscience. 
Whatever their political and ecclesiastical inclinations, most writers appeal to one or 
more of these criteria to justify their conclusions about the use of things indifferent. As 
might be expected, however, the interpretation and application of these three principles 
vary in telling ways, particularly when it comes to the rule of charity. Closer 
consideration of the criteria for proper use will set the stage for analyzing the standards 
that inform Milton‘s treatment of adiaphorism in A Mask and Paradise Regained.  
Based on passages such as Romans 14.23—―And he that doubteth is damned if 
he eat, because he eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith is sin‖24—one 
common requirement is that adiaphora be used in faith. In the context of Romans 14 and 
                                                 
23
 To give just a few examples: Bagshaw maintains that the use of adiaphora should be governed by 
―generall Precepts for the Use of them either way,‖ precepts such as ―Do all things to the glory of God, 
And, Do what makes most for edification, and the like‖ (2). Similarly but with an additional provision for 
proper self-love, Tombes argues that indifferent but potentially scandalous things should be done if (and 
only if) ―according to true prudence they appeare to bee necessary for Gods glory, our owne salvation, or 
our brethrens good‖ (168). Racster notes that using adiaphora in ways that are ―lawful, profitable, and 
edifying, is good law, policie and divinitie‖ (66-67), but he stresses that ―both law and profite‖ should ―be 
tempered by charitie‖ (67). Fullwood endorses Marlorate‘s suggestion that the church should follow Paul‘s 
example, who ―confirmeth his Traditions by the Word of God, Reason, Edification, the Example of 
Churches, Decency, and Order‖ (33). Fullwood himself offers an extended discussion of ―Rules of 
expediency, peace, offence of the weak, edification, decency, order, and the custome of the Churches‖ (46; 
cf. Shagan 508). Similarly complex, Clark reviews at least half a dozen types of circumstances that could 
render an otherwise indifferent thing (action, belief) problematic (46-48). Tombes also lists several ways 
in which adiaphora can become evil in practice, including when the use of them would violate ―the 
command or prohibition of the Magistrate‖ (178) or when either one‘s own opinion or the conscience of 
others remains unsettled as to whether this adiaphoron is really indifferent (182-[1]83). Verkamp implies 
on several occasions that faith and love were the two main criteria for the proper use of things indifferent, 
at least for mainline reformers in the earlier sixteenth century (e.g., 70, 77).  
24
When not imbedded in the writing of early modern adiaphorists, all Bible passages are taken from the 
King James Version (1987).  
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the debate about things indifferent, acting in faith takes on a rather specific meaning, 
related to the personal convictions of those who are using (or not using) the adiaphora in 
question, especially their convictions about their freedom to use these things. Brooke 
thus claims that it is impossible to ―Act in Faith,‖ if one still has ―Doubts, or Scruples‖ 
about the action in question (32).
25
 The difficulty with this criterion, of course, is that if 
taken alone it would seem to create an entirely subjective standard for the use of things 
indifferent, opening the door to any form of licentiousness, so long as one could claim to 
feel no compunction about it.  
This makes the other criteria for proper use particularly important. The most 
commonly recognized, perhaps, is the rule of charity.
26
 As Tombes explains, ―[t]he same 
God that hath . . . given his people so ample a privilege, as leave to use of all indifferent 
things, hath thought good neverthelesse to limit it by the law of charity‖ (205-06; cf. 
Verkamp 117; Calvin 3.19.11). This rule serves to restrain the use of adiaphora so that 
Christians‘ freedom does not devolve into a licentiousness that would harm others. 
                                                 
25
 Brooke urges the scrupulous to seek to reason themselves to the church‘s conclusion (32-33), but of 
course there is no guarantee that everyone ever will reach the authorized conclusions. Some writers 
advocate accommodating the scrupulous in such cases, but only until they have been properly educated 
about their Christian liberty (Verkamp 124). Those who persist in scrupulosity are eventually ―accounted 
rather wilfull then weake, and therefore not to be regarded‖ (Tombes 234-35), since such ―are not the 
weake ones of whom the Apostle speaks‖ (Tombes 224, cf. 223-25). Milton makes a similar distinction 
(De Doctrina 540-41) and also implies that genuine weakness ought to be a temporary state (539-40). He 
requires that, rather than ―be[ing] over-hasty in judging the freedom of the strong,‖ the weak ―should 
present themselves for instruction‖ (Milton, De Doctrina 541). 
26
 This is also spoken of in terms of the edification of the church (cf. Verkamp 167), but the two are 
closely related. Calvin comments, ―Charity is the best judge of what tends to hurt or to edify: if we allow 
her to be guide, all things will be safe‖ (4.10.30). 
According to Verkamp, it was a perceived lack of charity that helped motivate the early modern revival of 
the doctrine of things indifferent (115). Erasmus and early reformers believed that Christians‘ efforts to 
obey human traditions in the use of adiaphora had led them to neglect charity—or, at least, to ―utterly 
confus[e] it with some trivial, moralistic scheme of works-righteousness‖ (Verkamp 115). They hoped that 
renewed emphasis on the doctrine of things indifferent would enable Christians to practice true charity 
more freely (Verkamp115). 
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Unfortunately, since ―the question of what charity means is . . . an interpretive one‖ 
(Fish, How Milton 246), it can be difficult to determine exactly how this rule applies to 
any particular context. Further complicating matters, the need for charity is two-fold. 
Verkamp explains, ―In addition to consideration of the ‗weak,‘ the ‗election‘ and ‗doing‘ 
of adiaphora in accordance with the rule of charity or edification  also require[s] . . . a 
keen regard for the general welfare of all members of the Church‖ (167). Love must be 
shown to individual fellow believers by making appropriate accommodations for the 
―weak,‖ whose over-scrupulous consciences might be offended by one‘s use of things 
indifferent; at the same time, one must also demonstrate Christian charity by promoting 
the wellbeing and growth of the church as a whole, an obligation often interpreted in 
terms of maintaining unity and peace. 
The double aim of the rule of love is important because, by each emphasizing a 
different aspect of the rule of love, both sides of the adiaphora controversy could claim 
to be fulfilling this criterion.
27
 For example, within the debate about worship ceremonies, 
those who wanted allowances for non-conformity complained that it would be 
uncharitable to require Christians to participate in ceremonies against their 
consciences—particularly when those ceremonies, though perhaps indifferent in 
themselves, remained closely associated with superstition and idolatry (Tombes 178). 
On the other hand, the opposing side worried that emphasizing Christians‘ freedom in 
the use of things indifferent might lead to selfish licentiousness and antinomianism, 
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 Charity is the more common and explicitly Biblical criteria, but see also Shagan‘s discussion of how 
both sides of the adiaphora debate could claim to promote moderation (506). 
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without any concern for others‘ good (Verkamp 115-16, passim).28 From this 
perspective, ceremonies are imposed for the sake of preserving order and promoting the 
common good, and using the required forms of worship therefore becomes a 
demonstration of love for the church and commonwealth.
29 
 
It is convenient to contrast these two perspectives as though they were 
completely distinct, but in practice it was often more rhetorically effective to argue both 
sides of the case—with telling qualifications attached to one or the other. For example, 
in his lengthy list of criteria for the proper use of adiaphora, Fullwood lays particular 
emphasis on both sides of the appeal to charity: ―the great principle of all . . .  
impositions [regarding the use of things indifferent] must be charity and love to our 
Brethren‖ (42), while ―the most noted Rule of all is that of the Apostle, Let all things be 
done decently and in order‖ (42-43). Fullwood effectively obviates the potential conflict 
between these standards by equating concern for the good of one‘s neighbor with 
concern for ―the Common good‖ (Fullwood 32-33, referencing Rogers). Interpreted 
along these lines, the rule of charity would tend to privilege order and communal good 
over the convictions of conscientious objectors. 
Predictably, the emphasis shifts in treatises about the danger of ―scandalizing.‖ In 
scandalizing, ―strong‖ Christians‘ use of things indifferent offends more scrupulous, 
―weak‖ Christians and potentially encourages (or, in the case of authorities, forces) the 
―weak‖ to follow suit in using the adiaphora in question. This is problematic because, 
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 See also Fish (How Milton 353-4) and Kahn (―Revising‖ 541; Machiavellian 136, 289). 
29
 Moreover, it could also be argued that adhering to the mandated ceremonies also shows love for God, 
since it evinces obedience to him (Calvin 3.19.13) via submission to the authorities he has appointed. 
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for those with doubts about the ―thing‖ in question, their use of it will automatically be 
sinful because not done ―in faith.‖ John Tombes pronounces ―a woe‖ on ―them that 
scandalize others by abuse of their liberty in things lawfull against charity‖ (143, 
emphasis mine cf. 149). In his view, it is the scandalizer, not the scrupulous, who 
―hinder[s] the peace, that sweet peace that should bee between Christians that are 
members of the same body‖ (Tombes 153). Supporters of this position sometimes frame 
the rule of charity in terms of using (or not using) adiaphora in ways that will bring 
―edification‖ to other believers (e.g., Bagshaw 2). Indeed, for Clark, ―the Rule of 
Edification‖ is the key to navigating ―[t]he whole business of Scandal‖ (109), because 
edification is ―the great end of all Church-matters‖ (Clark 109).  
Clark‘s comment provides an instructive contrast to Fullwood‘s claim that 
concern for the good of one‘s neighbor means looking out for ―the Common good‖ 
(Fullwood 32-33, referencing Rogers). Those who favor institutional control of 
adiaphora expect individual believers to sacrifice strict adherence to their convictions 
out of charity toward the church and commonwealth. In contrast, those intent on 
protecting the consciences of individual Christians feel that charitable concern for the 
spiritual wellbeing of individuals should prevent the church and crown from hindering 
Christians‘ freedom in the use of things indifferent. Each side makes a good case, as far 
as it goes, for how it fulfills the rule of charity, yet these two lines of reasoning lead to 
conflicting courses of action.
30
 As a result, the rule of charity is perhaps the most 
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 See Fish for a discussion of how Milton‘s tendency to internalize allows him to claim to promote order 
and privilege the individual conscience in his Apology (1642) (How Milton 126). 
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discussed and yet least helpful of the three criteria—a difficulty that Milton addresses in 
his reworking of the criteria for proper use in A Mask and Paradise Regained.   
In large part, he does so through the third common criterion, which requires that 
adiaphora be used (or not used) to the glory of God. This criterion is relatively stable 
and straightforward. Samuel Rutherford concludes in his 1646 treatise that ―Gods glorie 
is the end that ruleth the use of Ceremonies, as they are indifferent‖ (5); two decades 
after the Restoration, Samuel Clark similarly affirms that the end for which adiaphora 
are used must be ―the glory of God‖ (47, referencing 1 Corinthians 10.31). Compared to 
love for one‘s neighbors, adiaphorists evidently found the requirement of glorifying God 
to be fairly straightforward; at least, the brevity with which it is often treated suggests 
general agreement as to its basic interpretation.  
When writers do expand on what glorifying God might look like in the use of 
things indifferent, they often explain this criterion in terms of thankfulness. This 
connection between gratitude and seeking God‘s glory has clear Biblical roots in 
passages such as Romans 14.6, the end of which states that whoever ―eateth, eateth to 
the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he that eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and 
giveth God thanks‖ (Romans 14:6, emphasis mine). Interpreting the third criterion for 
proper use as a requirement for gratitude also has other advantages as well. As will be 
discussed below with reference to Milton‘s conception of gratitude, this virtue is 
particularly useful for guarding against superstition, licentiousness, and idolatry—the 
three main perversions of adiaphorism (cf. Calvin 3.10.3,  3.19.4).  
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2.5 Adiaphorism in Early Modern England: A Summary  
For many writers in the adiaphora controversy, then, the use of things indifferent 
should be guided by the rules of faith and charity and the aim of glorifying God, perhaps 
especially through thankfulness. Properly interpreted and applied, these criteria guard 
against both licentiousness and superstition—either of which, as seen above, can lead to 
idolatry. However, the task of interpreting and applying these criteria is not always as 
straightforward as one might hope. The rule of faith may seem overly subjective, and the 
rule of charity is particularly open to debate—so contested, in fact,  that both supporters 
of conformity and advocates of individual freedom can claim that their position best 
meets this criterion. As will be seen, Milton‘s reworking of the three standard criteria in 
A Mask and Paradise Regained addresses this tension by foregrounding the requirement 
of gratitude, even as it also complicates the generally cursory treatments given to this 
third criterion.  
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3. ADIAPHORISM AND MILTON’S DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA 
3.1 Milton, Authority, and the Criteria for Proper Use  
As a context for analyzing these literary explorations of adiaphorism, it will be 
helpful to first review Milton‘s more direct treatment of the subject in relevant passages 
of De Doctrina Christiana.
31
 Given that adiaphorism is generally seen as a sub-doctrine 
under Christian liberty, Milton‘s discussion of Christian liberty provides a logical 
starting point:  
CHRISTIAN LIBERTY means that CHRIST OUR LIBERATOR FREES 
US FROM THE SLAVERY OF SIN AND THUS FROM THE RULE 
OF THE LAW AND OF MEN, AS IF WE WERE EMANCIPATED 
SLAVES. HE DOES THIS SO THAT BEING MADE SONS INSTEAD 
OF SERVANTS AND GROWN MEN INSTEAD OF BOYS, WE MAY 
SERVE GOD IN CHARITY THROUGH THE GUIDANCE OF THE 
SPIRIT OF TRUTH (Milton, De Doctrina 537). 
The first point of interest here is the locus of authority in Milton‘s conception of 
Christian liberty. In his view, believers are not obligated by the written law (―THE 
LAW‖) of Scripture, (De Doctrina 537). He means this in a comprehensive sense: in the 
discussion of the gospel that directly precedes his treatment of Christian liberty, Milton 
argues at length for the irrelevance of both the ceremonial and the moral law for the 
Christian believer (De Doctrina 525-536; cf. Fish, How Milton 324, 367). Likewise, he 
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 In view of the extensive study performed by Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, David 
I. Holmes, and Fiona J. Tweedie, I follow the current scholarly consensus in assuming that De Doctrina 
Christiana can in large part be attributed to Milton. 
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maintains that Christians are free from the dictates of human authorities (―MEN‖) (De 
Doctrina 537). His explanation is particularly relevant to the controversies surrounding 
adiaphora: ―we are freed from the judgments of men, and especially from coercion and 
legislation in religious matters‖ (De Doctrina 538). Underscoring the implications of 
Christian liberty for public policy, Milton argues against ―magisterial ordinances which 
compel believers to uniformity or deprive them of any part of their freedom‖ (De 
Doctrina 541).
32
 Such interference is inappropriate, as he elsewhere explains, because 
every individual Christian is equipped with ―the spirit‖ and with ―the mind of Christ‖ 
and is therefore ―entitled to interpret the Scripture . . . for himself‖ (De Doctrina 583). 
Indeed, Milton maintains that no one else‘s interpretation of Scripture can benefit a 
believer ―unless that [other] person‘s interpretation coincides with the one he makes for 
himself and his own conscience‖ (De Doctrina 584, 583).    
Clearly, Milton holds that it is up to the individual believer to figure out how to 
use Christian liberty, including with reference to adiaphora. If believers cannot simply 
follow the guidance of the moral law or human authorities, of course, this raises the 
question of how they are to discern the right course of action. In Stanley Fish‘s view, 
Milton has no ―set of criteria‖ for the use of things indifferent, since ―by interiorizing the 
landscape of choice, he has detached it from the realm of empirical evidence‖ (How 
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 Later, in his discussion of biblical hermeneutics, Milton clarifies that his point extends to both secular 
and religious leaders; ―[n]o visible church, . . .  let alone any magistrate, has the right to impose its own 
interpretations upon the consciences of men as matters of legal obligation, thus demanding implicit faith‖ 
(De Doctrina 584). However, it should be noted that Milton does acknowledge that rightful authorities 
may have some power to regulate adiaphora earlier in De Doctrina, during his discussion of prelapsarian 
providence (De Doctrina 353)—although he generally places much greater emphasis on the liberty of the 
individual Christian‘s judgment.  
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Milton 477-78).
33
 Fish is right to stress the difficulties caused by Milton‘s tendency to 
internalize standards of judgment, but his insight should be balanced against the 
recognition that Milton does invoke all three of the standard criteria for proper use.
34
  
                                                 
33
 Although Fish frequently makes this point, it should perhaps be noted that he also allows that certain 
considerations do guide Jesus, including ―whether [things‘] use in particular circumstances advances or 
subverts God‘s glory‖ (How Milton 365). 
34
 Fish argues that Milton believes the only obligation is always ―to do God‘s will‖ (How Milton 484, 
passim), but as Fish himself recognizes, this is too broad to be of much practical help. After all, the 
―uncertainty‖ of Milton‘s protagonists ―attaches not to the identification of the imperative—do God‘s 
will—but to the identification of the stance or course of action that is its local fulfillment‖ (Fish, How 
Milton 5). According to Fish, Milton simply does not offer any consistent standard for identifying what 
God‘s will is (How Milton 484, 500-01, passim), at least none that can be reliably verified. The only test 
for proper use is each individual‘s own, internal conviction about God‘s will for him or her (Fish, How 
Milton 477, passim). Unfortunately, no one can ever be sure that an alleged conviction of God‘s will is not 
merely self-interested self-deception. A believer‘s sense of what God wants may be guided by the inner 
light or spirit, but Fish does not believe that this can bring any certainty, since these promptings 
themselves cannot be empirically verified by those who feel them or by anyone else (Fish, How Milton 
103, 501, 504). This emphasis on the difficulty of determining the proper course of action leads Fish to 
view Christian liberty as a doctrine that leads to ―a moral life that is fraught with anxiety and danger‖ 
(How Milton 367). However, the anxiety Fish describes is antithetical to the very purpose of Christian 
liberty in general and adiaphorism in particular (cf. Silver 352, n32). Christian liberty would not be freeing 
unless it involved a real choice with multiple acceptable options. Indeed, Verkamp asserts that one of the 
main purposes of the doctrine of things indifferent ―l[ay] in calming men‘s consciences before God about 
the use or non-use of things indifferent‖ (165). Milton‘s own discussion of good works in De Doctrina 
offers a similar view. He acknowledges that ―one work may be more prefect than another in matters where 
Christian liberty is exercised,‖ as when Paul says that the one who marries ―does well‖ and the one who 
does not ―does better‖ (Milton, De Doctrina 644, quoting from 1 Cor. 7.38). Milton‘s ―may‖ suggests that 
there may be other situations in which neither choice would be better than the other, but even when one is 
superior, one has a duty but not an obligation to choose what is best. The duty is bound up in glorifying 
God and loving one‘s neighbor: ―there is nothing by which God‘s glory or our neighbor‘s instruction may 
most effectually be promoted which is not a matter of duty‖ (644). If one feels convicted that this course 
of action rather than that will advance God‘s glory and fellow humans‘ good, one has a duty to act 
accordingly—but this conviction does not necessarily create an obligation, in Milton‘s view. Milton cites 
examples of extraordinary expressions of love for others in the New Testament and concludes that these 
―singular proofs of love . . . arise from free choice rather than obligation,‖ since ―perfection is set before 
all men as a goal, but not all are required to reach it‖ (De Doctrina 644). For Milton, in other words, the 
Christian has a ―duty‖ to choose the best option when using adiaphora, and this would be the way of 
perfection; however, the Christian who does not choose the best option in such cases has not violated his 
or her moral ―obligation,‖ because it is not actually expected that everyone will live up to what is best. 
This implies that, contrary to Fish‘s reading, Milton does actually conceive of Christian liberty as 
something that creates real choices among multiple goods—goods that, while not equal, may all be 
morally acceptable options for the Christian. See also Kahn‘s discussion of how Milton follows the Puritan 
argument ―in enlarging the sphere of things indifferent and giving the individual conscience discretion in 
such matters‖ (Machiavellian 171) yet does not do so in order to support ―the usual puritan position, 
according to which ‗nothing is indifferent‘‖ (Kahn, Machiavellian 174). Instead, Kahn argues, 
―indifference‖ remains ―a matter of individual judgment‖ for Milton (Machiavellian 174). The individual 
is actually authorized to choose either option.  
 25 
It could be argued that Milton alludes to all three of the common criteria in his  
definition of Christian liberty. Because of Christian liberty, believers ―MAY SERVE 
GOD‖ (presumably for his glory) ―IN CHARITY‖ (the rule of love), ―THROUGH THE 
GUIDANCE OF THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH‖ (who inscribes the internal Scripture, the 
basis of the rule of faith, on believers‘ hearts)35 (Milton, De Doctrina 537). The same 
criteria are more explicitly stated in Milton‘s description of good works. ―GOOD 
WORKS,‖ he writes, ―are those which WE DO WHEN THE SPIRIT OF GOD WORKS 
WITHIN US, THROUGH TRUE FAITH, TO GOD‘S GLORY, THE CERTAIN HOPE 
OF OUR OWN SALVATION, AND THE INSTRUCTION OF OUR NEIGHBOR‖ (De 
Doctrina 638). Here the three criteria are clearly present: ―THROUGH TRUE FAITH, 
TO GOD‘S GLORY,‖ for our own assurance and our neighbor‘s edification (638).  
Given how variously these criteria can be interpreted—and how idiosyncratic 
Milton can sometimes be—it is important to clarify how he understands the rules of faith 
and love and the requirement of glorifying God. For Milton, acting ―in faith‖ most 
basically means acting in accordance with one‘s personal convictions, particularly 
convictions about one‘s Christian liberty. He explains that ―however we employ this 
[Christian] liberty of ours, we should act in firm faith, convinced that we are allowed to 
do so‖ (Milton, De Doctrina 539). The highly internalized nature of this conception of 
the rule of faith has prompted Fish to claim that ―Milton‘s thinking‖ has a ―strongly 
antinomian cast‖ (How Milton 484). While there is some truth to this, it is also important 
to recognize the (admittedly, internalized) way in which Milton grounds this criterion. 
                                                 
35
 On this writing on the believer‘s heart, see Milton, De Doctrina (587-90). 
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As he explains elsewhere in De Doctrina, the Christian‘s conviction must be based on 
Scripture (De Doctrina 587-90). To be more precise, conviction should be guided not by 
the external, communally interpreted Bible but rather by the internal writing of God by 
his Spirit on the heart of each believer (De Doctrina 587, 589-90).
36
 Fish is quick to 
point out that there is no way to verify that this is happening; even if one‘s convictions 
about one‘s liberty are based on the internal Scripture, the rule of faith still appears 
purely subjective from the outside, and perhaps even to the believer himself or herself 
(How Milton 503). However, if one grants Milton‘s claims about the work of the 
Spirit—as he clearly expects his readers to do—then his concept of internal Scripture 
does anchor his version of the rule of faith, preventing a fall into antinomianism (cf. 
Woodhouse, qtd. in De Doctrina 531, n15). 
Still, it is true that Milton‘s emphasis on inner judgment makes it difficult for the 
believer (much less anyone else) to feel confident that a conviction about his or her 
liberty in a given case accurately reflects the internal Scripture (Fish, How Milton 503). 
This is particularly unsettling when the believer‘s convictions seem to contradict human 
authorities or even the letter of the external Scripture. Such a conflict is possible 
because, though the internal and external Scriptures generally agree, ―where particular 
commandments are concerned,‖ sometimes ―the spirit is at variance with the letter‖ 
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 Milton holds that Christians ―have . . . a double scripture‖: ―the external scripture of the written word‖  
and ―the internal scripture of the Holy Spirit which he, according to God‘s promise, has engraved upon the 
hearts of believers‖ (De Doctrina 587). As Fish suggests, this amounts to ―decentering . . . Scripture as a 
self-sufficient and publicly available source of authority in favor of the internal authority of rightly 
constituted hearts‖ (How Milton 71). See also Schwartz‘s helpful analysis of Milton‘s belief in a double 
Scripture. She comments, ―we have ‗a double scripture‘, an external one and an internal one, and because 
the written one does not address many concerns and because it must be interpreted, ‗all things are 
eventually to be referred to the Spirit and the unwritten word‘‖ (49, quoting from De Doctrina). Schwartz 
also discusses how, in Reason of Church-Government, Milton argues that this Spirit-informed internal 
Scripture outweighs the traditions to which church authorities were apt to appeal (49).  
 27 
(Milton, De Doctrina 532). When this happens, ―breaking the letter of the law‖ is 
necessary so that believers can ―behave in a way which conforms better with our love of 
God and of our neighbor‖ (De Doctrina 532-33).  
As this implies, the rule of charity works in tangent with Milton‘s internalized 
rule of faith. Thus, after affirming that ―the whole Mosaic law is abolished by the 
gospel,‖ Milton is quick to add that, ―in reality the law, that is the substance of the law, 
is not broken by this abolition‖ (De Doctrina 531). Rather, the law‘s ―purpose is attained 
in that love of God and of our neighbor which is born of faith, through the spirit‖ (De 
Doctrina 531).
 Accordingly, Milton stresses that ―attention to the requirements of charity 
is given precedence over any written law‖ (Milton, De Doctrina 532-33). The rule of 
charity interprets the rule of faith, since ―charity is ‗the interpreter and guide of our 
faith‘‖ (Schwartz 40, quoting Milton, De Doctrina) 37  
As would be anticipated, Milton focuses not on ―charitably‖ maintaining order 
through conformity but rather on Biblical directives about not offending other individual 
Christians. The use of Christian liberty, he explains, ―should give no just cause of 
offence to a weak brother‖ (De Doctrina 539).38 Since both Jesus and the Lady are 
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 See also Schwartz‘s analysis of Milton‘s use of the rule of charity as a Biblical hermeneutic. Schwartz 
comments, with reference to The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce,  
Milton argues here and elsewhere that all biblical laws are submitted to the higher divine 
laws of nature and charity – it is by these principles that we should judge the validity of 
biblical injunctions and by these principles that he will labour to interpret them. (39). 
As will be evident, in the context of the use of adiaphora, I interpret the rule of charity more in terms of 
human-human relations, whereas Schwartz focuses on the charity of God toward humanity (43).  
38
 Milton‘s use of the verb ―give‖ here is significant, gesturing toward the common distinction between 
giving offense by abusing liberty and having someone else (unreasonably) take offense at one‘s justifiable 
use of liberty. In his description of Christian liberty, Milton underscores this point with the qualifier ―just‖: 
Christians should not give any just offenses (De Doctrina 539), but evidently, they do not need to worry 
about unjust accusations of offensiveness. It is a distinction he makes more explicit when writing about 
good works. In general, good works should be done ―TO THE INSTRUCTION OF OUR NEIGHBOR‖ 
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tempted in isolation from ―weak‖ humans whose consciences might be offended by their 
use of adiaphora, it is also important to note the place Milton gives to self-love at 
several points in his discussion of good works.
39
 In addition to instructing others, a 
Christian‘s good works should give him or her greater confidence about his or her own 
hope of salvation (De Doctrina 638). Likewise, just as Christians are to avoid being a 
stumbling block to others, so also the believer should be sure to protect herself or 
himself from stumbling (Milton, De Doctrina 642).  
Of course, the danger in love for one‘s neighbor (or for oneself) is that the loved 
human can become an idol. This liability is partly addressed through the third criterion 
commonly invoked by adiaphorists, the requirement that all things be used to the glory 
of God. Milton explicitly includes this criterion in his guidelines for good works, which 
must be done ―TO THE GLORY OF GOD‖ (De Doctrina 640). As has been seen above, 
some adiaphorists conceive of this criterion primarily in terms of thankfulness in the use 
of things indifferent, but others merely mention the need to glorify God in passing, 
apparently assuming that the implications of this requirement  are self-evident. Within 
his theological discussion of good works, Milton is similarly brief, offering only a few 
Biblical proof texts (De Doctrina 640), none of which mentions a specific form of 
glorifying God in practice.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
(De Doctrina 641), setting a good example and not causing others—or ourselves—to stumble (641-42). 
However, should a neighbor be offended, ―if the offence comes about not through our fault but through the 
over-niceness or the wickedness of the other party, then offence is not given but taken‖ (De Doctrina 642). 
Like some of the writers noted above, Milton differentiates between the ―weak‖ and ―the malicious or the 
obstinate‖ (De Doctrina 541). For the latter, ―[n]o consideration is to be shown‖ (540) when they take 
offense.  
39
 This allowance for self-love is not unique; see also Tombes (168). 
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3.2 Milton, Gratitude, and Its Contraries  
Nevertheless, in both A Mask and Paradise Regained, Milton does interpret this 
criterion in terms of gratitude toward God; in the latter text, Jesus even explicitly links 
thanks and God‘s glory (Milton, PR 3.127-28). Milton‘s discussion of gratitude 
elsewhere in De Doctrina Christiana helps illuminate the reason for this emphasis on 
gratitude: the typical abuses of things indifferent are also expressions of the vices to 
which gratitude is opposed. Milton comments on this virtue and its contraries at several 
points in De Doctrina Christiana, but his account of gratitude toward God—a 
component of ―internal worship‖ (De Doctrina 656)—will be most relevant for 
analyzing gratitude and adiaphorism.
40
  
Gratitude toward God, Milton maintains, requires ―that we acknowledge that we 
are unworthy of the gifts God bestows upon us‖ (De Doctrina 659). It ensures, in other 
words, that adiaphora are used in a way that preserves proper relationships between 
humans, God, and indifferent things. Milton‘s description is generally consistent with 
Peter Medine‘s findings in his survey of the Judeo-Christian tradition of gratitude,41 in 
which this virtue is conceived of as ―acknowledgement, praise, and thanksgiving to God 
for benefits received‖ (129). However, Medine‘s summary of the broader theological 
                                                 
40
 Gratitude and related virtues and activities are discussed at several points in De Doctrina. Milton 
discusses gratitude and thanksgiving with regard to both inter-human obligations (De Doctrina 780) and 
the worship of God (659-660, 683). Gratitude toward humans is described elsewhere in De Doctrina as 
―the virtue which corresponds to generosity,‖ a virtue which ―requites favors with favors, or with 
thankfulness‖ (De Doctrina 780). Presumably because inter-human gratitude does not involve worship, it 
is opposed only to ingratitude (De Doctrina 780). The inward disposition of gratitude, or thankfulness, is 
distinct from but obviously related to the action of thanksgiving, which falls under the category ―Of 
External Worship‖ in De Doctrina and is defined as ―giving thanks with a joyful heart for divine benefits. . 
. . sometimes accompanied by singing, and by hymns in honor of the divine name‖ (De Doctrina 683).  
41
 Medine offers this survey as context for his detailed study of gratitude and ingratitude in Paradise Lost. 
Surprisingly, he does not draw on Milton‘s discussion of gratitude in De Doctrina. 
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tradition emphasizes an important point that remains only implicit in this section of De 
Doctrina. Beyond thankfulness for daily blessings, gratitude is ―fundamentally the 
acknowledgement of God‘s originary power in creating the universe‖ (Medine 117, cf. 
122). Creation itself is thus the first of the ―gifts God bestows upon us‖ (De Doctrina 
659), the foundation for all creatures‘ thankfulness. Although De Doctrina Christiana 
does not here refer to the grace of creation as the grounds for thanksgiving, this concept 
plays an important role in Milton‘s literary representations of gratitude.42 Medine has 
shown that ―Milton uses the fact of Creation and God as the originary source as a matrix 
within which he presents gratitude and ingratitude‖ in Paradise Lost (124), and as will 
be shown, both A Mask and Paradise Regained also assume a fundamental link between 
creation and the obligation of thankfulness.  
Both texts also present gratitude in opposition to ingratitude and idolatry, the two 
vices with which it is contrasted in De Doctrina Christiana. For Milton, gratitude 
basically involves (1) the recognition that a gift is undeserved and (2) the 
acknowledgement of God as the ultimate giver of any gift (De Doctrina 659). 
Ingratitude and idolatry each violate one or both of these requirements. De Doctrina first 
describes ingratitude, implying that this perverse response to blessings results from self-
satisfied indulgence in God‘s gifts. Milton cites Hosea 13.6 as a biblical illustration: the 
people ―found good pasture so they were well filled, and as soon as they were filled their 
hearts were exalted, and this is why they have forgotten‖ God (qtd. in Milton, De 
Doctrina 660). Those who are ungrateful thus fail with respect to the first point of 
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 See also Lehnhof on the connection between divinity and the act of creation in Milton‘s thought (235-
36, passim). Schwartz makes related comments in the context of divine charity (43, 50, passim). 
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gratitude. Because they do not recognize the goods they enjoy as undeserved gifts, they 
make no return of thanks to their benefactor. Instead, as the image from Hosea perhaps 
suggests, ungrateful humans sink to the level of thoughtless beasts, unable to look 
beyond the satisfaction of the appetites that have enslaved them. In the context of 
adiaphorism, ingratitude thus provokes the sort of licentiousness that conformists feared 
would ensue if every individual had freedom to follow his or her personal convictions in 
the use of things indifferent. 
As Medine argues, ingratitude is essential to fallenness in Paradise Lost, and it is 
worth pausing over Satan‘s ingratitude in that text because of the way in which this vice 
shapes his temptation of Christ in Paradise Regained.
43
 Satan‘s reflections in Paradise 
Lost underscore how deeply resentful he is of ―[t]he debt immense of endless gratitude, / 
So burdensome still paying, still to ow‖ (PL 4.52-53, qtd. in Medine 141). As Medine 
explains, gratitude ―depends on recognition and acknowledgement of the basic reality of 
God‘s beneficent creation and the individual‘s undeserved creation‖ (141). Refusing to 
admit these truths, Satan interprets giving and thanksgiving merely as strategies in a 
struggle for domination. He cannot or will not see gratitude as the ―empowering virtue‖ 
that it is, enabling even the poorest of poor to repay their benefactor simply ―by feeling 
the debt‖ (Medine 122, 141). As a result, even though he knows that gratitude is ―[t]he 
                                                 
43
 Ingratitude also plays an important role in humanity‘s Fall in Paradise Lost, as foreshadowed in the 
Father‘s prophecy about ―ingrate‖ humanity (Medine 139-140, passim; PL 3.97) and confirmed in Eve‘s 
changed mindset immediately following her sin. Once fallen, Schoenfeldt points out, Eve suddenly sees 
God as the anti-giver, ―‗Our great forbidder‘ (IX.815), known for his single prohibition rather than the 
bounteous gifts she and Adam had praised profusely in Book IV‖ (373; PL 9.815; cf. Medine 135-36). 
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easiest recompense‖ (PL 4.47; Medine 140), Satan views this obligation of as an onerous 
burden.
44
  
Of course, Satan is also guilty of idolatry. In contrast to the mindless 
consumption of ingratitude, idolatry does involve thankfulness for gifts received, but it is 
misdirected ―toward idols or created things, rather than toward God‖ (De Doctrina 660). 
Idolatry thus amounts to using adiaphora to the glory of someone or something other 
than God, whether by means of licentiousness or superstition. As indicated by Milton‘s 
proof texts for idolatry and his representation of this vice in Paradise Lost, idolatry can 
take several different forms. Most obviously, idolatry includes any overt worship of 
created things, such as ―sacrificing to the heavenly bodies. . . .and pouring out libations 
to them‖ (Jeremiah 44.17, qtd. in Milton, De Doctrina 660). More subtly, idolatry can 
also be seen in humans‘ submission to worldly pursuits, as seems implied by Milton‘s 
reference to Habakkuk 1.16: ―the wicked man sacrifices to his nets and burns incense to 
his fishing-tackle‖ (qtd. in De Doctrina 660). Satan and his followers model yet another 
version of idolatry in Paradise Lost. When Abdiel points out the angels‘ obligation to 
the Father and to the Son through whom he created them (PL 5.35-39), Satan counters 
that they are ―self-begot, self-raised‖ (PL 5.860). Particularly given the close association 
between divinity and the act of creation in Milton‘s theology (Lehnhof, passim), this 
assertion clearly amounts to self-idolatry, as is confirmed by Satan‘s later declaration 
that the fallen angels will ―assert‖ ―[t]hir Dieties‖ (PL 6.157). Thus, while Medine is 
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 See Donnelly for one of the more extended analyses of Satan‘s misunderstanding of God‘s giving and 
self-giving, framed in terms of ―competing accounts of reality (ontology)‖ (117; cf. 75, 104-05, 112, 197; 
cf. Schwartz 50-51). On a related note, Ricciardi comments, ―Satan defines friendship not in terms of how 
one gives, but in terms of how one receives‖ (135).  
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right to comment that, ―[i]n denying God‘s originary act, Satan denies God‘s authority 
and so becomes completely ungrateful‖ (Medine 143), it is also true that this ingratitude 
is accompanied and rationalized by idolatry. 
Ingratitude and idolatry both appear in A Mask and Paradise Regained, but each 
text foregrounds a different perversion of gratitude, along with corresponding abuses of 
things indifferent. The earlier drama more emphatically distinguishes between true 
gratitude and ingratitude, with Comus and his followers providing an extreme image of 
license. Paradise Regained, however, addresses the more complicated vice of idolatry 
(Lewalski, ―Milton‖ 224). Though Satan occasionally includes temptations to license in 
his appeals, he more frequently tries to lure Jesus into superstition and idolatry, primarily 
by suggesting that Jesus must use the gifts Satan offers if he is to fulfill his mission on 
earth.
45
 Although there is no clear indication that Milton planned Paradise Regained as a 
supplement to his work with gratitude and adiaphorism in A Mask, obvious similarities 
between the two texts—most notably the banquet temptations (Kean 440)—do invite 
comparison. Written at opposite ends of his adult life, Milton‘s masque and brief epic 
together provide a rich literary probing of gratitude and its contraries as they relate to the 
use of things indifferent, not only illustrating but also complicating Milton‘s treatment of 
gratitude and adiaphorism in De Doctrina Christiana.  
Indeed, before discussing A Mask and Paradise Regained in detail, it is worth 
previewing a third vice that, though evident both in these texts and in Paradise Lost, is 
not explicitly recognized in De Doctrina Christiana‘s discussion of gratitude. As a 
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 Fish comments extensively on Satan‘s presentation of his gifts as necessary. See How Milton (especially 
364-70).  
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variation on ingratitude, this third deviation from proper thankfulness can be called 
stoical ingratitude. If ordinary (self-indulgent) ingratitude enjoys blessings without 
giving thanks for them, stoical ingratitude is a similarly thankless response that refuses 
to acknowledge the goodness of God‘s gifts at all. As Fenton notes when discussing 
Adam‘s education in Paradise Lost, ―Michael reminds Adam that with possession of the 
‗gift‘ comes the duty to recognize the value of the gift, which in turn should incite 
gratitude‖ (171, emphasis mine; cf. 170). Without recognition of a gift‘s goodness, 
gratitude will not follow, even though mindless self-indulgence may be averted. 
Whereas self-indulgent ingratitude promotes licentiousness and leads to the idolatry of 
created things and their immediate sources, stoical ingratitude expresses itself as an 
excessive abstemiousness that might be seen as a passive form of superstition or as 
implicit self-idolatry.
46
 A hypocritical version of ingratitude, stoical ingratitude seems 
virtuous but in fact is not—rendering it especially threatening for those most set on 
avoiding idolatry and licentious forms of ingratitude.   
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 Eve‘s reaction to the Fall in Paradise Lost provides a clear example of this more subtle vice. When she 
suggests suicide as a means to curtail the consequences of sin (PL 10.966-106), Adam admits that such 
―contempt of life and pleasures‖ seems to suggest that there is ―in [her] something more sublime / And 
excellent then what [her] minde contemnes‖ (PL 10.1013-15). However, having earlier wrestled with this 
type of ingratitude himself (10.743-55; cf. Medine 143), Adam sees through Eve‘s superficial piety. Her 
death wish actually bespeaks ―anguish and regret / For loss of life and pleasures overlov’d,‖ rather than 
laudable ―contempt‖ for lesser goods (10.1018-19, emphasis mine). 
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4. A MASK: GRATITUDE, ADIAPHORISM, AND THE BOOK OF 
SPORTS CONTROVERSY  
4.1 Introduction: A Mask and the Book of Sports 
The Lady in A Mask (1634) is just such a person. Indeed, she grapples with both 
forms of ingratitude and the associated abuses of things indifferent. Though Milton does 
not privilege gratitude over charity as fully here as he later does in Paradise Regained, 
he does give gratitude a particularly prominent part in his masque, suggesting the 
usefulness of this criterion as a charm against both license and superstition. While this 
has implications for any use of adiaphora, A Mask can be fruitfully read in a narrower 
context, as a contribution to the controversy over licit recreations that was reinvigorated 
when Charles I  reissued the Book of Sports (1633) (Marcus, Politics 187, 169).
47
  
Initially issued by James I in 1618 as a defense of his policy against the 
prohibition of sports on holidays and Sundays,
48
 the Book of Sports stirred renewed 
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 Marcus reports that this connection has been recognized off and on since at least 1884 (Marcus, Politics 
169). See also Kahn (Machiavellian 144-45) and Marcus (―John‖ 237-38). Of course, A Mask is about 
much more than the conflict over the Book of Sports (Marcus, Politics 172), but of the various historical 
and biographical influences that scholars have identified in A Mask, the Book of Sports controversy is most 
relevant for understanding Milton‘s emphasis on gratitude as a response to the challenges raised by 
adiaphorism.  
48
 When first issued by James I in 1618, the Book of Sports served, Kahn explains, as ―an implicit defense 
of Anglican ritual and court ceremony,‖ at a time when ―James was trying to bring the Scottish church into 
conformity with the Church of England‖ (Machiavellian 190). It presents itself, however, as a response to 
―Papists and Puritanes‖ who had criticized James for chastising ―some Puritans & precise people‖ who 
prevented or punished licit recreation on Sundays and holidays (James 2-3). The text defends James‘s 
approval of Sabbath recreation, lists licit and illicit sports, and reaffirms the king‘s desire that—provided a 
few conditions are met—there be no prohibition of Sabbath pastimes that are not inconsistent with civil 
and ecclesiastical laws (James 5, 7). Licit recreations include dancing, May-games, Morris dances, and 
more (James 7); the conditions include that recreation may not interfere with church services (7), that no 
recusants may participate, and that some pastimes, such as bull-baiting, remain prohibited (at least on 
Sundays and for some people) (7-8). James authorizes church officials to seek the reformation of 
nonconformists and to turn the unrepentant over to the judicial system, where they will be forced to choose 
between conformity and exile (6). James explains that this severe punishment for nonconformity is 
justified by the need to protect both ―Our Authority‖ and ―Our Church‖ (6). As this rationale indicates, the 
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controversy when reissued. The details of the conflict cannot be explored here, but it is 
important to note that the Book of Sports became associated with Archbishop Laud and 
his emphasis on church ceremonies (Marcus, Politics 197-98). As a result, in addition to 
those who simply felt compunction about Sabbath activities, those who opposed Laud‘s 
policies in general might also feel obligated to reject sports—perhaps all sports, 
excessively, like Milton‘s Lady—as a means of distinguishing themselves from Laud 
and his conservative Anglican supporters (Marcus, Politics 197-98). In the midst of 
these tensions, ―[d]ancing, festivity and even masquing itself became strongly politicized 
activities‖ (Marcus, ―John‖ 238).  
This conflict directly affected John Egerton, First Earl of Bridgewater, whose 
installation as President of the Council of the Marches of Wales was the occasion for the 
performance of A Mask (Marcus, Politics 171). He experienced the effects of this 
conflict both through his political position (Marcus, Politics 171) and through the 
differing convictions about courtly entertainments held by his own family members—
three of which performed as the Lady and her Brothers in Milton‘s masque but two of 
whom had known scruples about masquing (Marcus ―John‖ 239; Politics 198).49  Given 
                                                                                                                                                
Book of Sports assumes the typical conservative position on charity in the use of things indifferent, 
according to which charity first and foremost requires the promotion of order and social stability for the 
sake of the common good. 
49
 According to Marcus, the Earl‘s responsibilities would have included ―enforcing Privy Council order 
and royal declarations like the Book of Sports,‖ and in fact, evidence indicates that the ―there was indeed 
some attempt to enforce that document by prosecuting those who participated in ‗unlawful games.‘‖ 
(Marcus, Politics 171). The Earl of Bridgewater in some cases showed tolerance for conscientious 
nonconformity (Marcus, Politics 175-76), whereas Archbishop Laud tended to invoke the standard pro-
ceremony conception of charity, according to which unity in externals is more important than honoring 
individual consciences (Marcus, Politics 201). Marcus emphasizes that Archbishop Laud, whom 
Bridgewater opposed, was ―very active in Wales,‖ seeking by various means to ―remov[e]  Wales from the 
darkness of its superstition and enforc[e] ecclesiastical conformity‖ (Politics 175). The Earl‘s family 
contained a variety of opinions on such matters: the women of the Bridgewater family appear to have had 
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this context, it is clearly significant that A Mask includes and interrogates many forms of 
recreation and entertainment. Marcus observes,  
Within its compact space, [A Mask] displays an amazing range of dances, 
rituals, and holiday pastimes both wholesome and nefarious, from the 
‗wavering Morrice‘ of the sea and the riot of Comus and his crew, to the 
harvest festivities of the shepherds about Sabrina, and finally to the 
Ludlow revelry of the Earl of Bridgewater and his guests. (Politics 169-
170; cf. ―John‖ 238)  
As this comment suggests, the alternately good and bad use of these things attests to 
their indifference. On one level, then, A Mask can be seen as an exploration of the 
meaning of the criteria that should guide one‘s use of indifferent pastimes and associated 
pleasures.50  
Based on Comus‘s Cavalier rhetoric and behavior, scholars have persuasively 
described him as ―a figure of court entertainment or sport‖ (Kahn, Machiavellian 195), 
representative of ―a libertine courtier‖ (Marcus, ―John‖ 240-41; cf. Politics 187) who 
                                                                                                                                                
―their own strongly Protestant religious culture‖ (Marcus, ―John‖ 237), and at least two of them had 
expressed reservations about masquing (―John‖ 239; Politics 198). However, ―the Earl and at least the 
elder son were more orthodox, though probably anti-Arminian and anti-Laudian‖ (―John‖ 239).  
50
 Although it would be beyond the scope of the present project to perform a detailed analysis of Milton‘s 
use of the genre of the masque, the political overtones of A Mask are reinforced by his manipulation of 
generic conventions (Marcus, Politics 171). To cite one of the more obvious departures from convention, 
whereas the king or a representative of his centralized power is traditionally the one who restores order in 
a masque, in A Mask the question of how to use external goods is faced by the Lady alone, and the 
problematic consequences of her response are resolved by a small group of (sometimes supernatural but 
never royal or ecclesiastical) individuals. See also Marcus, Politics 171, passim.  
Similarly, the many connections between Milton‘s masque and earlier masques cannot be fully 
explored here, but one connection bears mentioning as additional evidence for reading A Mask as a 
response to the Book of Sports controversy. As several scholars have noted, Milton‘s Mask echoes (with a 
difference) Ben Jonson‘s Pleasure Reconcil’d to Virtue, a masque produced in 1618, which was what 
Kahn calls ―an ideological justification of James‘s ‗Declaration of Sports,‘‖ though not without 
qualification  (Machiavellian 186, 191, 194; cf. Marcus, ―John‖ 238). Milton‘s allusions to Pleasure 
Reconcil’d to Virtue suggest a more critical response to the Book of Sports (Marcus, ―John‖ 238-39). 
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supports the policies promoted by the Book of Sports, albeit in an extreme, licentious 
way that Charles I himself would not have condoned (cf. Marcus, Politics 193). The 
Lady, on the other hand, behaves like a ―strong‖ Puritan (Marcus, Politics 198, 197), 
privileging her personal convictions and tending toward the opposite extreme of 
superstitious abstemiousness. Their competing versions of adiaphorism, neither of which 
is entirely affirmed by A Mask, highlight the dangers lying on both sides of the Book of 
Sports controversy—and the way in which honoring the requirement of gratitude can 
prevent these deviations from proper use. 
4.2 Round One: Charity, Pro-Sport Adiaphorism, and the Power of Giving  
As noted above, Comus builds his temptation to licentious revelry on distorted 
appeals to the rule of love and the requirement of gratitude, presumably because he 
anticipates the Lady‘s adherence to these commonly recognized guidelines. His strategy 
emerges clearly in the central temptation scene. When the Lady initially refuses his cup, 
Comus implicitly accuses her of both a lack of (self-)love and ingratitude: she is ―cruel 
to [her]self‖ (Mask line 679), and she is breaking a contract that she ostensibly made 
with Nature when she received her body—a body which (however young and beautiful) 
is also mutable and mortal (680-89). He reasons that refusing the physical pleasures that 
he offers is the equivalent of disdaining her embodied state,  
Scorning the unexempt condition  
By which all mortal frailty must subsist,  
 Refreshment after toil, ease after pain (Mask 685-87).  
 39 
From Comus‘s perspective, as Marcus observes, the Lady is guilty of ―spiritual pride by 
refusing to drink‖ and embrace her human limitations (Politics 194).  
Defenders of the Book of Sports and traditional pastimes used a very similar line 
of reasoning (Marcus, Politics 194)—so similar, in fact, that Marcus suggests that the 
obvious topical reference may explain why much of Comus‘s argument here was 
apparently cut from the performance of A Mask (Politics 195). Supporters of the Book of 
Sports and related policies, she explains, advocated ―a surrender of individual striving . . 
. and a reimmersion in community‖ (Marcus, Politics 194). Promoting a ―lesson of carpe 
diem,‖ such activity fostered ―a willingness to acknowledge human frailties and the 
limits imposed by time and the season‖ (Marcus, Politics 194).51 This united, humble 
activity was in turn believed to ―brin[g] divine blessings upon all and enric[h] and 
restor[e] the community‖ (Marcus, Politics 194). The pro-sport argument thus assumes 
the conservative conception of the rule of charity, in which charity is primarily concern 
for the community, even at the expense of violating some individuals‘ consciences. In A 
Mask, this line of reasoning takes the form of Comus‘s insistence that the Lady must 
partake of his potion—even against her conscience—and thereby join his community of 
revelers (cf. Marcus, Politics 194-95).  
Nevertheless, though Comus‘s appeal to self-love and community may be 
reminiscent of common arguments in defense of sports, the Lady does not initially 
bother to refute him on these points. Instead, she focuses on the implications of 
accepting a gift from Comus. Calling his offerings  ―lickerish baits fit to ensnare a brute‖ 
                                                 
51
 Guibbory also notes that ―Comus speaks in the voice of the libertine and carpe diem poetry that had 
become associated with the  court of Charles I‖ (77).  
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(Mask 700), she justifies her resistance by referring to her past experience of Comus‘s 
duplicity and her observation of  his ―ougly-headed Monsters‖ (695). These comments 
point toward the requirement of gratitude in the use of adiaphora, in that accepting a gift 
from Comus would create a debt of gratitude to him, rather than to heaven. At least for 
the audience, his opposition to the divine has already been established by the Attendant 
Spirit‘s explanation of how Comus‘s followers became dehumanized. They once had a 
―human count‘nance, / Th‘ express resemblance of the gods‖ (Mask 68-69). After 
drinking from Comus‘s cup, though, they became like their new, beastly benefactor: 
their godlike heads are 
. . . chang‘d   
Into som brutish form of Woolf, or Bear,  
Or Ounce, or Tiger, Hog, or bearded Goat (Mask 69-71).  
Accepting Comus, rather than heaven, as the source of gifts would put the Lady under 
―another obligation‖ to this new ―bestower‖ (Fish, How Milton 34)—creating the 
―divided spiritual loyalty‖ that Susan M. Felch calls ―the essence of idolatry‖ (61). The 
Lady accordingly refuses to entertain any of Comus‘s proposals once she recognizes him 
as a ―foul deceiver‖ (Mask 696): ―none / But such as are good men can give good 
things‖ (702-3).   
The overwhelming power of Comus‘s potion also has important implications for 
the debate about the use of indifferent pastimes. Marcus comments, ―Advocates of the 
Book of Sports liked to portray political obedience as a delightful form of liberty. But in 
Milton, what may appear to be liberty—a free choice of pleasure—turns out to be base 
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submission‖ (Politics 188). Given by a threatening character like Comus, the order to 
―[b]e wise, and taste‖ is not liberating but terrifying (Mask line 813). In the context of 
the Book of Sports controversy, the Lady‘s sad predicament—unwilling to consent to 
Comus‘s offer but unable to escape his palace—is suggestive of the dilemma faced by 
those who were not allowed to act in accordance with their more stringent Sabbatarian 
convictions. Comus‘s persistence, on the other hand, illustrates how the pro-sport party 
could be just as guilty as the Puritans of becoming legalistic (Marcus, Politics 202-03)—
and superstitious—by deeming it necessary to participate (rather than refrain from) 
indifferent sports.  
4.3 Round Two, Part One: Licentious Consumption and the Rule of Charity  
And Comus is persistent. Undaunted by the Lady‘s rejection of him as a giver, 
Comus mounts a second attack with a similar strategy, again suggesting that indulging in 
the pleasures he offers is the only way to fulfill the rule of love and the requirement of 
gratitude. The two rationalizations of license are interlinked in Comus‘s argument, but it 
will be convenient to analyze them separately, beginning with his pretended concern for 
charity. He first implies that the Lady is being uncharitable toward Nature. Nature has 
brought forth many things ―to please, and sate the curious taste‖ (Mask 714, 709-20), yet 
the Lady refuses to enjoy them. Moreover, if others follow suit, Nature will be harmed 
by a destructive glut of unused natural resources (720-21, 728-36). Without waiting for a 
reply, Comus proceeds, in more typically Cavalier fashion, to argue that the virginal 
Lady is also showing a lack of charity toward would-be lovers, since she selfishly insists 
on keeping her lovely, young body to herself (737-42).  
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 It is this last charge that makes the Lady angry enough to talk back (Mask, lines 
757-61), but she never directly refutes Comus‘s attack on sexual abstinence, since he is 
unworthy to hear the ―serious doctrine of Virginity‖ (787). Instead, she begins her 
reply—which was ―strengthened and extended‖ as Milton revised the text of A Mask 
(Marcus, ―John‖ 241)—by almost immediately describing Comus‘s strategy as a 
manipulation of standards, an attempt to deceive her with ―false rules pranckt in reasons 
garb‖ (Mask, line 759). Having called him out for his distortion of the real criteria for 
proper use, the Lady proceeds to counter Comus‘s claims about charity toward nature 
and the wider human community.  
One might expect that her response would echo the reasoning of adiaphorists 
sympathetic to the plight of scrupulous consciences: the rule of charity is a call to 
accommodate the convictions of the individual (―weak‖) Christian. However, she does 
not take up this line of argument. Instead, the Lady reinterprets the rule of charity within 
the framework of the common good, skillfully co-opting the ground typically held by 
those who favored conformity. Nature‘s purpose for her many works, the Lady says, is 
not that one individual might excessively indulge but rather that everyone should 
charitably share natural resources, so that all may have enough (762-74; cf. Fish, How 
Milton 12, 155-56). Moderate consumption, not Comus‘s revelry, is the way to love both 
Nature and one‘s neighbors.52 The Lady‘s version of the rule charity thus promotes 
                                                 
52
 Her reply reflects a broader conception of the rule of charity that Verkamp describes in his study of 
earlier English adiaphorism:  
The Christian who really believes in the indifferent nature of food, money, clothes, and 
like maters, will not be anxious or avaricious in their regard, but having cast his lot with 
the Lord, and recognizing the latter‘s Providence, he will accept all such things in a 
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communal wellbeing while also stressing that licentious excess is not compatible with 
the common good.  
4.4 Round Two, Part Two: Gratitude as a Cross-Check for Alleged Charity  
If the Lady merely offered an alternative version of charity, Comus and his 
supporters could object that they simply prefer their own conception of charity to the 
Lady‘s. Milton corroborates the view of charity that the Lady espouses—and 
undermines Comus‘s supposed charity—by shifting the focus to the requirement of 
gratitude.  It is a criterion that Comus first brings up in the second round of temptation, 
discussed above with reference to the rule of charity. Hoping to sway the Lady by 
appealing to her virtue, he presents self-indulgence as the path to not only charity but 
also gratitude: consumption of natural resources is a necessary step toward thanking 
Nature and Nature‘s God (Mask 705-755). If the Lady rejects his revels, Comus 
suggests, her only alternative is ―lean and sallow Abstinence‖ (Mask 709; cf. McGuire 
161).  Associating the latter option with caricatured images of Stoicism and Cynicism 
(Mask 707-08; Flannagan 155, n474), Comus claims that refusing his feast will cause 
mass asceticism, leading down a slippery slope to globalized ingratitude. With no one 
consuming anything, ―the all-giver‖ himself will go completely ―unthank‘t, . . . 
unprais‘d‖ (Mask 723), and all of Nature‘s provision will be ungratefully left to rot.   
Rejecting his reductive equation of temperance with total abstinence (cf. 
McGuire 161), the Lady corrects Comus‘s distortion of the requirement of gratitude,53 
                                                                                                                                                
spirit of thanksgiving, and exercise in their regard a charitable stewardship that is in 
accordance with his station in life. (167; cf. Calvin 3.10) 
53
 Kahn comments that the Lady responds to Comus‘s temptation by ―redefin[ing] the problem as one not 
simply of use but of right use‖ (Machiavellian 206). However, to some extent, Comus is already 
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arguing that true gratitude comes not through licentiousness but rather through the 
moderate use of temporal resources. This way, not only would everyone have enough 
(Mask 759-774), but  
. . . the giver would be better thank‘t,   
His praises due paid, for swinish gluttony  
Ne‘re looks to Heav‘n amidst his gorgeous feast,  
But with besotted base ingratitude  
Crams, and blasphemes his feeder. (Mask 755-59)  
Gluttons simply are not grateful but blasphemous; Comus‘s sort of consumption cannot 
meet the requirement of glorifying God through gratitude, and it must therefore be 
rejected. The aptness of the Lady‘s reply can be seen in Comus‘s response. Like Satan 
before Christ in Paradise Regained, he is confounded by her reasoning, even fearing that 
her rebuttal is ―set off by som superior power‖ (Mask 801). Out of arguments, Comus 
seems about to turn to force when the Lady‘s brothers burst in on the scene. 
4.5 The Rule of Faith or Passive Superstition?  
In light of her witty reply to Comus‘s temptation, it is clear that the Lady 
intellectually recognizes his abstinence-indulgence dichotomy as fallacious (cf. McGuire 
161). Nevertheless, her immobility after her brothers‘ arrival suggests that, in practice, 
she may have fallen into Comus‘s categories (cf. Marcus ―John‖ 240-41, 243). Subtle 
changes in her range of motion seem to support this reading of the Lady‘s predicament. 
When the main temptation scene opens, she finds herself at a luxurious banquet in 
                                                                                                                                                
presenting it as an issue of right use. He simply (and wrongly) argues that right use means total self-
indulgence.  
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Comus‘s palace, described by the stage directions as ―set in an inchanted Chair.‖54 In 
response to Comus‘s proffered glass, she ―goes about to rise,‖55 only to be quickly 
reprimanded by her host, who claims that his wand can freeze her nerves and turn her 
into ―a statue‖ (Mask 661, 660-62). Both the Lady‘s motion and Comus‘s warning 
suggest that, although she is already ―immanacl‘d‖ (Mask 665), the Lady retains some 
freedom of movement. After her brothers scare Comus away, however, the Attendant 
Spirit describes the Lady as ―[i]n stony fetters fixt, and motionless‖ (Mask 819, emphasis 
mine). The difference could be a mere oversight on Milton‘s part, but the alteration may 
be significant—particularly given that the masque was originally written for 
performance. The Lady could not have earlier ―go[ne] about to rise,‖56 if she were 
already reduced to a ―motionless‖ state (Mask 819), nor would Comus‘s threat have had 
any meaning if she were already as still as stone. Although one might be tempted to 
attribute her progressive immobilization to Comus‘s magic, neither Comus nor the Lady 
indicates that he casts any further spell on her during their debate, despite his initial 
warning.  
What, then, makes the Lady less able to move at the end of their conversation 
than she was at the beginning? As Marcus suggests, her temporary paralysis may imply 
that the Lady has been too severe in rejecting earthly things (―John‖ 241-45). Intent on 
resisting licentiousness, she has unwittingly fallen into the very stoical ingratitude that 
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 Mask page 153, stage direction preceding line 658.  
55
 Mask page 153, stage direction preceding line 658.  
56
 Mask page 153, stage direction preceding line 658.  
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Comus described as the only alternative to gluttony (cf. McGuire 161).
57
 In the terms of 
the adiaphora debates, this stoical ingratitude is a passive expression of superstition. The 
Lady‘s inability to move attests to a deep-seated belief that it is necessary not to use 
indifferent pleasures such as food and dance—adiaphora previously offered by Comus 
but also available (in moderation) at her intended destination, Ludlow Castle. If the Lady 
believes that she is not free to use these things, then abiding by her conviction would 
seem to be in keeping with the rule of faith. However, much as the incompatibility of 
gluttony and gratitude highlights the distortions in Comus‘s reasoning about things 
indifferent, so also the Lady‘s inability to fulfill the other two criteria indicates that 
something has gone awry in her convictions about her (lack of) freedom in using 
adiaphora. She rejected Comus‘s feast because consumption should be moderated by 
charity, but the Lady‘s overcorrection has brought her to an immobilized state in which 
she cannot actively love others. Likewise, her scruples have left her unable to make use 
of—much less give thanks for—indifferent things.58  
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 Several scholars have proposed less negative views of the Lady‘s immobilization. At least at one point, 
Kahn suggests that the Lady‘s immobilization can be read as positive or negative, making it part of ―the 
interpretive crux of the masque: is the Lady‘s stasis a form of action or inaction, willed obedience or the 
inability to will (to go forward)?‖ (Machiavellian 196). Fish argues that the Lady‘s physical 
immobilization is not truly important, because ―from a point of view that denies the primacy of the 
physical, she is formidable, protected, and free‖ (How Milton 153). However, it seems likely—particularly 
given the visual symbolism often prominent in masques—that the Lady‘s physical state is meant to reflect 
her inner, spiritual condition. Moreover, the efforts of her brothers, the Attendant Spirit, and Sabrina to 
free the Lady all suggest that her confinement is a problem. 
58
 Though not specifically referring to A Mask, Fish‘s observation on Milton‘s attitude toward the created 
world aptly captures the reason why superstition abstention is so problematic:  
Milton asks us not to shun the world of moral experience but to appreciate it for the right 
(Augustinian) reason—for the reason that it is, in all its variety, a testimony to the 
goodness of its creator. If this reason is the content of your apprehension and 
appreciation, then delight in the created world is not only allowable but is, as Uriel tells 
the disguised Satan, an obligation. (How Milton 11-12) 
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Thus, the Lady wisely corrects Comus in theory but overcorrects herself in 
practice, another likely connection to the Book of Sports controversy. As mentioned 
above, Marcus suggests that the Lady may be in a position parallel to that of Puritans 
who believed that some pastimes were licit and yet felt compelled to refrain from all 
sports in practice, in order to make a statement against Laudian policies (Marcus, 
Politics 198, 197). The problem, of course, is that by following this strategy the Lady 
inadvertently undermines the very principles that she advanced in her arguments against 
Comus. 
4.6 Adiaphorism Restored: Grateful Deliverance and Celebration 
The means by which the Lady can be released from her fixed state supports the 
view that her paralysis is an expression of her stoically ungrateful, superstitious rejection 
of indifferent things. Before their rescue effort, the Attendant Spirit instructs the Lady‘s 
brothers to ―sease [Comus‘s] wand‖ (Mask 653). When they fail to do so, he belatedly 
explains that the wand, if inverted, would have enabled them to free their sister (Mask 
815-17). Of course, the idea that ―[r]eversing a magician‘s rod . . . would obviate his 
power‖ does not originate with Milton (Flannagan 160, n522). In the context of the 
Lady‘s and Comus‘s debate about the proper use of adiaphora, however, this detail 
seems particularly significant. It suggests that the solution to Comus‘s excess is not to 
(stoically, superstitiously) expel all desires but rather to properly direct them to the 
charitable, thankful use of blessings. 
With Comus‘s wand of desire gone, the Lady can only be freed by Sabrina, ―a 
gentle Nymph‖ (Mask 824) who models the principles of proper use that the Lady has 
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lost sight of. Prior to becoming a nymph, Sabrina was herself resurrected from a violent 
death through the anointing of ―the porch and inlet of each sense‖ (Mask 839), making 
her a particularly apt figure to restore the Lady to her proper desires. Sabrina is also 
explicitly associated with both charity and thanksgiving. Particularly interested in 
helping maidens in distress, she also makes a general practice of bringing restoration and 
healing to local herds, using ―pretious viold liquors‖ that, as Marcus notes, stand in 
direct opposition to Comus‘s cup (―John‖ 243; 847).59 Moreover, Sabrina‘s charity 
elicits gratitude, including God-ward gratitude. In response to the aid she gives their 
herds, ―the Shepherds at thire festivals / Carrol her goodness lowd in rustic layes‖ (Mask 
848-49; cf. Marcus, ―John‖ 243).60 Once she has freed the Lady, the Attendant Spirit 
also blesses Sabrina and, furthermore, acknowledges that it is ultimately ―Heaven‖ that 
has given him and the children ―grace‖ (Mask 937)—preventing Sabrina or the freedom 
she brings from becoming an idol.  
Sabrina also serves as a foil for Comus in ways specifically relevant to the debate 
about policies regarding participation in sports and entertainment (Marcus, Politics 199-
201; ―John‖ 243). Like Comus, she ―is associated with music and dancing‖ (Marcus, 
―John‖ 243; Politics 199), and as mentioned, she ―becomes a focal point for holiday 
pastimes‖ celebrated by shepherds (Marcus, Politics 200). However, Sabrina illustrates 
an alternative to Comus‘s policy of using verbal and threatened physical force to compel 
participation in recreation. As noted above, Comus‘s insistence on the Lady‘s 
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 Flannagan notes that Sokol characterizes Sabrina‘s actions on behalf of the herds as a ―charitable 
practice‖ (Sokol, qtd. in Flannagan 161, n533). 
60
 As McGuire suggests, the simple, thankful celebration honoring Sabrina stands in sharp contrast to the 
revels of Comus‘s followers, who glut themselves on his banquets and show no true gratitude (161; cf. 
Marcus, Politics 200). 
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participation in his revels is reminiscent of pro-sport authorities‘ refusal to allow 
individual conviction to upset the uniformity that they deemed good for the church 
(Marcus, Politics 198-99, 201,). In contrast, Sabrina is not coercive;
61
 she ―comes only 
in response to earnest prayer‖ (Marcus, Politics 200). When invoked, she comes and 
truly liberates the Lady, enabling her to travel on to her intended destination and 
participate in guilt-free, celebratory dancing. The contrary outcomes of Comus‘s and 
Sabrina‘s contrary strategies imply that forcing sports on the scrupulous will lead to an 
overreaction into puritanical superstition, whereas granting greater freedom in recreation 
will promote the proper use of pastimes in keeping with personal convictions, the rule of 
love, and the need for God-ward gratitude.
62
  
After the Lady‘s liberation, A Mask concludes with two images of proper use, 
one earthly and the other heavenly. The earthly setting of proper use, Ludlow Castle, is 
explicitly associated with gratitude—appropriately, since the plot thus far has shown 
gratitude to be an antidote to the vices that cause both license and superstition. The 
Attendant Spirit describes Ludlow Castle to the children as a place ―[w]here . . . are met 
in state / Many a friend to gratulate‖ their father‘s ―wish‘t presence‖ in Wales (Mask 
948-150). Presumably, the ―gratulat[ing]‖ friends are ―express[ing] joy at the coming or 
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 Marcus notes that this may align her with ―the Earl of Bridgewater‘s tolerant stand toward 
nonconformity (Politics 201). 
62
 Marcus makes a similar observation: ―If Comus and his crew enact a travesty of the Laudian style of 
church government, in which individual spiritual well-being is subordinated to the preservation of power 
at the center and the cohesion of the whole,‖ she argues, ―then Sabrina can be seen as offering an alternate 
paradigm for the relationship between pastimes and ‗authority‘‖ (Politics 200). However, Marcus does not 
imply that Milton here adopts an extraordinarily radical position on the question. In fact, given the 
connections that William B. Hunter has noted between A Mask and the Anglican liturgy for the Feast of St. 
Michael and All Angels, celebrated on the day of A Mask‘s performance, she maintains that ―Milton‘s 
trenchant criticism of a corrupt ecclesiastical power is . . . cast in a framework which upholds the liturgy of 
the church‖ (Marcus, Politics 201).  
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appearance of‖ the children‘s father (―Gratulate,‖ def. 1). However, a more archaic sense 
of the verb, still in use in Milton‘s day, may also be relevant. At least as late as 1673, 
―gratulate‖ was sometimes used to mean ―[t]o be grateful for or show gratitude for,‖ to 
―thank‖ or ―express gratitude to (a benefactor)‖ (―Gratulate,‖ def. 4). Ludlow Castle is 
thus an atmosphere colored by thanksgiving, offering moderate entertainments in a 
context conducive to their proper use. Having resisted the lure of licentious, self-
indulgent ingratitude and learned by hard experience the subtle dangers of stoical 
ingratitude and superstition, the Lady joins her brothers ―in victorious dance / O‘re 
sensual Folly, and Intemperance‖ (Mask 974-75)—an image that need be incongruous 
only if one accepts Comus‘s fallacious reasoning (cf. McGuire 161).63  
Following the dance at Ludlow Castle, the Attendant Spirit closes A Mask with 
an epilogue describing his ascent back to his place in the heavenly realms, offering what 
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 The liturgical context in which A Mask was performed is also worth noting: In reaffirming the 
possibility of rightly using indifferent pastimes such as dance, the scene at Ludlow Castle also echoes the 
message of the morning liturgy for the Feast of St. Michael and All the Angels, which coincided with the 
performance of A Mask (Marcus, Politics 201). Most directly relevant to adiaphorism is a passage from 
Ecclesiasticus 39, part of the morning lesson:  
The principal things for the whole use of man‘s life are water, fire, iron, and salt, flour of 
wheat, honey, milk, and the blood of the grape, and oil and clothing. All these things are 
for good to the godly: so to the inners they are turned into evil. . . . All the works of the 
Lord are good: and he will give every needful thing in due season. (qtd. in Marcus, 
Politics 202, 201, emphasis mine) 
The triumphant children show that pleasant pastimes can be well-used, ―for good to the godly‖ 
(Ecclesiasticus 39, qtd. in Marcus, Politics 202), even as the Attendant Spirit‘s reference to their trials also 
reminds the audience of the strenuous effort needed to recognize and reject licentiousness and superstition 
(Mask 970-72). 
Given that the Book of Sports controversy specifically focused on the use of recreation on the 
Sabbath, it is also worth noting that the morning lesson for the day included Mark 2.23-28, in which Jesus 
corrects the Pharisees‘ legalistic understanding of the Sabbath by explaining, ―The sabbath was made for 
man, and not man for the sabbath‖ (qtd. in Marcus, Politics 202). Unsurprisingly, ―[t]his was one of the 
proof texts in the Book of Sports controversy, cited repeatedly by the prosport party to buttress their own 
position in defense of Sunday and holiday pastimes against the Sabbatarians‖ (Marcus, Politics 202). 
However, as Marcus suggests, Milton also implies a critique of those who legalistically demand recreation 
on the Sabbath (Politics 203). Comus‘s threat of forced licentiousness is, after all, at least as disturbing as 
the Lady‘s immobilization, and neither extreme allows for the proper—charitable and thankful—use of 
adiaphora. 
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Felch has called ―the heavenly perspective on earthly life‖ (68). For present purposes, 
two points should be emphasized. First, ―the broad fields of the sky‖ (Mask 979) are 
apparently strewn with pleasures. When relating what he will experience on his 
heavenward flight, the Attendant Spirit invokes almost all of the senses: The daughters 
of Hesperus sing (982-83), provided with cool ―shades and bowres‖ (984). Pleasant 
smells include nard and scents wafted in by the ―musky wing‖ of the ―West wind‖ (991, 
989). Visually, the inhabitants of heaven enjoy flowers more colorful than the rainbow 
(992-95). The evocative details of this description underscore the potential value of the 
arts and sensory pleasures even in heaven, suggesting that their corresponding shadows 
on earth are not necessarily evil or dangerous, contrary to the over-scrupulous.  
As a second, related point, the epilogue may also imply that the proper use of 
adiaphora here fits one for greater delight hereafter. Particularly noteworthy is the 
contrast between two heavenly couples: the weeping Venus and wounded Adonis, on the 
one hand, and the ―Celestial Cupid‖ and ―his dear Psyche,‖ on the other (Mask 1004-05). 
The latter couple is ―farr above‖ Venus and Adonis (1003), and Flannagan observes that 
there may be a tacit ―contrast between the love of Venus as profane and outside marriage 
and the love of Cupid and Psyche, within a marriage sanctified by the gods‖ (170, n626). 
This heavenly privileging of love in the approved context of marriage highlights the 
long-term value of right use: the choices one makes about earthly adiaphora, such as 
romantic love, evidently affect the extent to which one is able to enjoy the amplified 
version of these goods in heaven. Delayed gratification—patiently waiting to act until 
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the rule of charity and the requirement of gratitude are truly fulfilled—ultimately brings 
greater gratification, not only in this life but also in the next.  
Of course, the whole plot of A Mask has shown just how challenging it can be to 
discern when the criteria for proper use have truly been fulfilled. Fittingly, the image of 
Cupid and Psyche in the epilogue may subtly emphasize this difficulty while also 
underscoring the value of making the effort to use adiaphora according to the dictates of 
conscience, charity, and gratitude. The Attendant Spirit‘s description of Cupid and 
Psyche includes a brief reference to Psyche‘s ―wandring labours long,‖ which she had to 
endure prior to winning the gods‘ approval and being exalted to her now-blissful state 
(Mask, line 1106). In Areopagitica (1644), Milton mentions, in particular, the test in 
which Psyche had to sort out many ―confused seeds‖ (qtd. Flannagan 170, n627). 
Flannagan notes that, in Areopagitica, Milton interprets this myth ―as a symbolic 
representation of the way that grains of truth or goodness can be extracted from masses 
of evil knowledge‖ (Flannagan 170, n627). Like the Lady and her brothers, Psyche‘s 
trial required her to find the truth amidst many counterfeits, but her hard labors were 
followed by heavenly rest. The children have already won ―a crown of deathless Praise‖ 
for their proper use of adiaphora (Mask 973); Psyche‘s bliss suggests that still greater 
rewards await them if they persevere in resisting the temptation to abuse things 
indifferent. 
 Accordingly, the Attendant Spirit ends the masque with an exhortation to 
mortals desirous of heaven:  
Love vertue, she alone is free,  
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She can teach thee how to clime  
Higher then the Spheary chime‖ (Mask 1019-21).  
The way to heavenly pleasures, he implies, is not to seize this day, as Comus claims—
nor to utterly reject it, as the Lady once thought—but rather to use indifferent recreations 
and other adiaphora virtuously, assisted as necessary by ―Heav‘n it self‖ (1023).64 As 
has been shown, gratitude provides a particularly helpful guide to virtuous use, not only 
because it can help confirm (or refute) claims about what is charitable but also because it 
averts both Comus‘s ungrateful, licentious consumption and the Lady‘s (stoically) 
ungrateful, superstitious rejection of adiaphora.  
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 Similarly, Kahn comments that ―the Spirit‘s final vision of nature‘s bounty appropriates and revises 
Comus‘s carpe diem through its allusion to Spenser‘s erotically charged Garden of Adonis‖ (Kahn, 
Machiavellian 207). 
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5. PARADISE REGAINED: THANKSGIVING DEFENDED, 
IDOLATRY RESISTED 
5.1 Introduction: Adiaphorism and Gratitude in Paradise Regained 
In his brief epic, Milton embarks on a broader, more sophisticated treatment of 
adiaphorism, in which God-ward gratitude becomes the primary criterion for proper use,  
central both to Satan‘s temptations and to Jesus‘s resistance. While Comus pretends 
concern for gratitude merely as a means to promoting license, Satan‘s goal is more 
directly tied to the perversion of gratitude. He wants Christ to accept something—
anything—from his hand, so that the Son of God will be beholden to him, an idolatrous 
inversion of the power relations of giving and thanksgiving against which Satan rebelled 
in Paradise Lost. Indeed, for Satan all of the proposed abuses of adiaphora are a means 
to this end. Perhaps partly as a response to the Tempter‘s strategy, God-ward gratitude 
becomes the main standard by which Jesus exposes the counterfeit charity and 
distortions of Scripture in Satan‘s arguments. When Christ repeatedly refuses his offers, 
Satan finally attempts to manipulate this nay-saying itself by urging Jesus to embrace 
idolatry and subtle ingratitude under the guise of Stoicism. Nevertheless, Jesus proves 
more astute than the Lady, successfully resisting even this seemingly virtuous lure, 
largely by holding fast to the requirement of God-ward gratitude in the use of things 
indifferent.  
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5.2 The Stones-to-Bread Temptation: Distrust and the “Bait of Charity”65 
If Satan wants to gain power over Christ by persuading him to accept his aid, 
Satan first needs to convince Jesus to distrust the Father‘s provision. Accordingly, the 
Tempter insinuates that Christ has been abandoned by the Father in their very first 
conversation (Lewalski, Milton’s 200-01). He suggests that ―ill chance‖—not the 
providential prompting of the Spirit (PR 1.189)—―hath brought‖ Christ to the wilderness 
(PR 1.321; cf. Lewalski, Milton’s 200-01). This echoes Comus‘s opening temptation in 
both language and aim, recalling how he asks the Lady ―[w]hat chance . . . hath bereft 
[her] thus‖ of company in the woods (Mask 277). However, the divergent paths the 
tempters take in developing this similar strategy attest to their differing aims.  
For the purpose of tempting her to ungrateful, licentious consumption, it is not 
essential that Comus persuade the Lady to distrust her brothers. He simply needs to get 
her to his lair, where he can present her with his various attractions. It may be easier to 
convince her to follow him if he can ―replace [her brothers] with himself in the Lady‘s 
affection‖ (Flannagan 136, n193), but other means to the same end will suffice. Thus, 
when the Lady does not accept Comus‘s negative portrayal of her brothers, he readily 
shifts to praising the boys, even offering ―[t]o help [her] find them‖ (Mask 291-304). 
This sycophantic concern achieves the goal of Comus‘s earlier efforts to provoke 
distrust: in desperation, the Lady reluctantly accepts him as a guide and helper (Mask 
320-330). In contrast, distrust is essential to Satan‘s plan to become Christ‘s provider, 
                                                 
65
 The phrase ―bait of charity‖ is from Stein (91) and is also quoted by Fish (How Milton 332).  
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prompting the Arch Tempter to pursue this goal relentlessly (Lewalski, Milton’s 225).66 
However, in this first encounter, Jesus anticipates and rejects the offer of guidance to 
which the Lady fell victim, preemptively telling Satan, ―Who brought me hither / Will 
bring me hence, no other Guide I seek‖ (PR 335-36; Lewalski, Milton’s 201).  
Undeterred, Satan attempts a less direct approach to distrust, this time under the 
guise of charity. To support his prediction that Jesus will probably die—like others who 
travel the desert alone—of hunger and of thirst (PR 1.337-39), Satan claims that he and 
his desert community, ―[m]en to much misery and hardship born,‖ must struggle to 
―[l]ive on tough roots and stubs, to thirst inur‘d / More then the Camel‖ (PR 1.339-41). 
Taking a page from the Lady‘s rebuttal of Comus‘s Cavalier charity, Satan frames the 
stones-to-bread temptation in terms of what appear to be legitimate duties of love. When 
he demands that Christ, ―if . . . the Son of God / Command‖ stones to become bread (PR 
1.342-43), Satan reasons that doing so will not only meet Jesus‘s own needs (self-
charity) but also (charitably) provide for the less fortunate desert dwellers (Stein 91; 
Fish, How Milton 332).  
Jesus sees through Satan‘s false appeal to the rule of charity and rejects his 
temptation for what it is—a continuation of the call to distrust that Satan initiated in their 
                                                 
66
 The repeated recommendation of doubt in Paradise Regained confirms its importance as a key first step 
in Satan‘s scheme to replace the Father as Christ‘s benefactor. This can be seen, for example, in Satan‘s 
early claim that Christ has been neglected by the Father longer than any previous prophet was (PR 2.315), 
and it continues in his much later assertion that a storm (which Satan caused) signifies that Christ has 
missed his chance to act and will suffer as a consequence (4.465-84). There is a sense in which every 
temptation is designed to persuade Jesus to distrust the Father, thereby making way for Satan to enter as 
his new benefactor. As Fish comments, Jesus ―would evidence distrust if he accepted any of the actions 
Satan urges as paramount; for he knows . . . that what is paramount . . . is the obligation to do God‘s 
will‖—whether or not the means Satan offers are used (How Milton 53-54). 
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opening exchange.
67
 In keeping with some Protestant exegetes‘ interpretation of the 
stones-to-bread temptation as a call to doubt the Father‘s provision (Lewalski, Milton’s 
178, 223),
68
 Satan‘s demand ―suggest[s] . . . distrust‖ (PR 355) by implying that God 
cannot be counted on to sustain Jesus (and any other desert dwellers) with or without the 
assistance of bread. As Fish points out, Jesus‘s refusal affirms the indifference of bread, 
despite its apparent importance for human survival (Fish, How Milton 375). Like any 
other indifferent thing, it must be used with true charity toward others, which is never 
incompatible with the God-ward gratitude that would be undercut by distrusting the 
Father. 
Before moving on to the second part of Satan‘s food temptation, it will be helpful 
to highlight a pattern that begins in the stones-to-bread temptation and continues through 
at least Satan‘s offering of Rome. As Arnold Stein argues, Satan frames his temptations 
as charitable means to address various human needs:  
The stones turned to bread would provide food for self and the 
‗wretched‘; the acceptance of the banquet would relieve nature and her 
‗gentle Ministers‘ of their troubled shame over the hunger of the lord of 
nature; the affectation of ‗private life‘ was depriving ‗All Earth her 
wonder at thy acts‘; the acceptance of Parthia would deliver the ten tribes, 
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 Fish claims that ―the reality of [the desert dwellers‘] suffering is not diminished simply because the 
tempter is discerned to be other than he ‗seem‘st‘ (348)‖ (How Milton 332). While it is true that hunger, 
like Satan‘s other grounds for temptation, is a ―real proble[m]‖ (Fish, How Milton 332), it appears clear 
that Satan is lying about the existence of this particular, hungry desert community. The next day, when 
Jesus awakes hungry, he climbs a hill ―[f]rom whose high top to ken the prospect round, / If Cottage were 
in view, Sheep-cote or Herd; / But Cottage, Herd, or Sheep-cote none he saw‖ (PR 2.236-38). If there 
actually are wretched desert dwellers in the area, why does Jesus see no one?  
68
 The reasoning behind this was that eating bread after a forty day fast hardly seems like gluttony—the 
more traditional diagnosis of this temptation (Lewalski 178, 223). 
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as their fathers were delivered from the land of Egypt (Stein 91; qtd. in 
Fish, How Milton 332).  
Satan‘s distortions of the rule of charity will be considered in detail below, but it is 
worth noting here that his strategy has important implications for the use of things 
indifferent in Paradise Regained. Citing Stein‘s summary, Stanley Fish argues that all of 
these problems ―are either ignored or scorned by the responses of the Son‖ (Fish, How 
Milton 332). In fact, though, Jesus often does give a reason for rejecting the act of 
charity that Satan proposes, and in many cases his reason is bound up in the requirement 
of gratitude. With some temptations, acting as Satan suggests would misdirect Christ‘s 
own gratitude. On other occasions, Jesus refrains from performing a proposed act of 
charity because he is waiting for the inner promptings of God or conscience to bring 
idolatrous or ungrateful people to repentance, thereby fitting them for freedom. Even 
when Satan seems to be supported by the rule of charity and Scripture itself, Jesus‘s 
awareness of these failures in gratitude enables him to resist the Tempter‘s lures. 
5.3 Satan’s Table: Charity, Superstition, and the Idolatry behind Satan’s Gifts 
Though the ―bait of charity‖ often involves aid to some group of humans, it takes 
rather different forms in the next temptation, Satan‘s banquet in the wilderness (Stein 91; 
cf. Fish, How Milton 332); echoing Comus, Satan portrays Nature and, less obviously, 
Jesus himself as the potential objects of Christ‘s charity. Satan‘s initial call to distrust 
remains implicit in all of the temptations, but beginning with the banquet temptation he 
more directly pursues the goal of giving something to the Son as a means of gaining 
power over him through a debt of gratitude. Though he follows this strategy throughout 
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much of the rest of Paradise Regained, the banquet temptation provides a particularly 
apt example for the present study. A Miltonic invention, the feast strongly recalls 
Comus‘s table (Kean 440),69 but the two banquets and the tempters‘ presentations of 
them differ in telling ways. Again, the distinctions reflect the fact that, whereas Comus 
just wants the Lady to follow him in the licentious abuse of adiaphora, for Satan the 
abuse of adiaphora is a means to a more ambitious end, the aim of making Jesus owe 
him the gratitude that Satan refused to pay the Son of God in Paradise Lost.  
Like Comus in A Mask, Satan justifies his feast by pretending that partaking will 
fulfill the law of charity. In offering food to the fasting Jesus, Satan makes a tacit appeal 
to self-love, since hunger is generally classed among the ―[l]awful desires of Nature,‖ as 
Satan himself points out when strategizing with his demonic council (PR 2.230). In 
addition to invoking self-love, Satan also adapts Comus‘s argument that consumption is 
a charitable response to Nature‘s bounty. When Comus claims that the Lady has a duty 
to participate in the feast, lest Nature become overburdened (Mask 720-36), the Lady 
counters that Nature would not have a surplus if her provisions were justly distributed to 
all (Mask 760-775). Satan avoids this retort by shifting the focus away from Nature‘s 
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 Visual and verbal echoes reinforce the connection. Satan appears in a courtly guise that recalls Comus‘s 
Charles-like description in A Mask. Satan is now ―[a]s one in City, or Court, or Palace bred‖ (PR 2.300). 
When Satan asks if the hungering Jesus would eat ―if Food were now before [him] set,‖ Jesus‘s answer 
clearly echoes the Lady‘s refusal of Comus‘s cup: he will eat ―[t]hereafter as [he] like[s] / The giver‖ 
(2.321-22). On the other hand, while Satan‘s sumptuous spread clearly serves a similar purpose as the 
Comus‘s luxurious table, it is worth noting that the narrator‘s description of Satan‘s feast also recalls the 
Attendant Spirit‘s description of heaven, with its more pleasant offerings. Critics have proposed a number 
of (not necessarily exclusive) interpretations of Satan‘s feast, not all of which can be given here. To cite 
just a few examples, it has been seen as a foil for the Communion table (e.g., Martz, qtd. in Hillier 5; 
Lewalski 217), an image of ―the Roman Catholic mass‖ (Lewalski 217), and an ironic foreshadowing of 
Christ‘s spiritual repast at the end of Paradise Regained (e.g., Lewalski 218). The feast is somewhat 
conventional, ―a literary temptation‖ whose details are ―familiar from past romances‖ (Kean 436). Kean 
sees connections to A Mask but focuses on ―echoes . . . of the descriptions of Eden in Paradise Lost‖ 
(440).  
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needs, toward Christ‘s. Playing off of Jesus‘s newly felt hunger and his developing sense 
of his special status and purpose, Satan inverts the relationship suggested by Comus, 
claiming that Nature offers the feast out of a sense of duty to Christ. She is, Satan says, 
―asham‘d, or . . . / Troubl‘d that‖ he—―her Lord‖—―shoul[d] hunger‖ (PR 2.332-33, 
35). Since Jesus‘s participation in the feast would alleviate Nature‘s shame, consumption 
of the banquet would be a charitable (and therefore justifiable) use of these indifferent 
things (PR 2.332-36, 369-76; Stein 91; Fish, How Milton 332)..   
Accordingly, Satan implies that refusing to eat represents a failure to recognize 
the indifference of natural resources, comparable to the puritanical form of superstition 
that binds the Lady in A Mask:  
 What doubts the Son of God to sit and eat?  
 These are not Fruits forbidden, no interdict  
 Defends the touching of these viands pure,  
 Thir taste no knowledge works, at least of evil,  
 But life preserves, destroys life‘s enemy,  
Hunger, with sweet restorative delight. (PR 2.368-73) 
Satan reasons that, in the absence of an ―interdict‖ to render their use evil in this case, it 
is permissible and even right to use these (indifferent) dishes, drawing on their natural, 
life-giving properties to meet Jesus‘s legitimate physical needs. There even seems to be 
 61 
some truth to Satan‘s claims; carefully avoiding superstition, Christ rejects the feast 
without denying either his hunger or his right to Nature‘s adiaphoristic provisions.70  
Since food is indifferent when considered in the abstract, some circumstantial 
factor must account for the hungry Christ‘s decision to refrain from feasting. Given the 
recurrence of similar offers and refusals throughout Paradise Regained, it is worth more 
closely considering Christ‘s motivation for abstaining in this early instance. Perhaps the 
most obvious explanation is that, like Comus‘s table, Satan‘s banquet is marred by erotic 
overtones, excessive quantities of food, and overly fancy dishes, raising concerns about 
licentiousness—more specifically, gluttony and the other lusts of the flesh (cf. Kean 436; 
Ricciardi 144, 198; Dei Segni 166-68). After all, Jesus does ―contemn‖ the food as 
―pompous Delicacies‖ (PR 2.390), and the satanic feast can be seen as a Miltonic 
extension of the stones-to-bread temptation, which was often interpreted as a temptation 
to gluttony and fleshly indulgence (Lewalski, Milton’s 177, 223). However, feasting 
itself is not prohibited in either A Mask or Paradise Regained. Christ even enjoys a 
salutary banquet immediately following his final desert temptation (PR 4.586-93). The 
danger of license may partly explain his refusal of Satan‘s feast, but something more 
than the mere quantity and quality of food seems to be at issue. 
Aside from simple gluttony, critics have proposed two other explanations that 
merit particular consideration. Both reflect the suspicion that Satan‘s assurances 
                                                 
70
 Lewalski offers a similar reading of Christ‘s response (Milton’s 217-18), but Fish disagrees, maintaining 
that Christ makes his reply ―in the context of Satan‘s assertions, which he entertains as hypotheses‖ 
(―Things‖ 172). Fish‘s argument is essentially that that Christ deems derivative both his and Satan‘s right 
to and power over earthly goods, implying that they both have this power/right only as granted by the 
Father (―Things‖ 172). Although there is a sense in which this is true, Fish‘s argument seems overly 
precise, particularly in the case of the banquet temptation.  
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ironically highlight exactly what is not acceptable about his offering. First, several 
scholars have pointed out that the description of the feast in Paradise Regained (2.327-
28) belies Satan‘s claim that it is in compliance with Mosaic Law;71 this violation, the 
reasoning goes, would render the food no longer indifferent but rather evil. However, as 
Barbara Lewalski argues, the presence of illicit foods might not, in itself, motivate Christ 
to refrain from eating (Milton’s 216). Abstaining on these grounds could suggest that he 
―subject[s] himself (and his church) to the dietary prohibitions of the Law which he has 
come to supersede‖ (Lewalski, Milton’s 216)—a form of superstition. Whether or not 
one accepts Lewalski‘s view of Christ‘s relationship to the Law, Jesus simply does not 
mention dietary regulations when he refuses Satan‘s banquet.  
Given that Satan lies about whether the meal contains unclean foods, it is 
unsurprising that scholars have also questioned his assertion that the food was not 
sacrificed to idols (PR 2.328-29; Lewalski, Milton’s 216, passim; Kean 436). Taken 
literally, however, the idea that the dishes must be shunned because they have been 
sacrificed to idols is difficult to support. Neither Jesus nor anyone else in Paradise 
Regained ever indicates that the food has been used in actual idol worship.
72
 Even if it 
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 For instance, see Lewalski (Milton’s 216, 226) and Kean (436). Lewalski credits Michael Fixler with 
this observation (Milton’s 216). 
72
 Milton does not clearly indicate that the food has been sacrificed to idols, as he easily could have done. 
Even if Milton did explicitly state that the food had been sacrificed to idols, basing Christ‘s abstention on 
this fact alone might seem to imply that he was ―still subservient to the scruple about eating foods offered 
first to idols, whereas Paul declares that the Christian is free to eat such things‖ (Lewalski 216). Moreover, 
had Milton warned only the reader about the food being tainted, it is not apparent how Jesus—particularly 
Milton‘s Jesus, with his strikingly circumscribed knowledge—could be aware of the banquet‘s history. If 
he did not know that it was previously sacrificed to idols, he would not be responsible for rejecting it on 
those grounds, since, as Paul also teaches in 1 Corinthians 10, Christians can purchase meat and attend 
dinner parties without inquiring as to whether the food has been sacrificed to idols (1 Corinthians 10.25-
30). Indeed, the main reason Paul gives for abstaining from food known to have been sacrificed to idols is 
that one should not eat such dishes if doing so would offend someone else‘s conscience (1 Corinthians 
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had been, New Testament directives regarding food sacrificed to idols—often invoked in 
the adiaphora debates—portray such food as remaining indifferent; it is to be eaten or 
not eaten depending on the convictions of the eater, the requirements of charity, and the 
glorification of God.
73
 In Jesus‘s temptation, there are no ―weak‖ believers present to 
accommodate, nor does Jesus indicate that he has scruples about the food itself.  
The requirement of gratitude, however, does raise concerns, not because the food 
has been literally sacrificed to idols but because the banquet is hosted by the Enemy. 
Lewalski makes a similar point in proposing a more plausible explanation for why the 
meal is idolatrous—a reason closely linked to issues of giving and thanksgiving and one 
that also applies to Comus‘s offerings in A Mask, where Jewish dietary laws and the 
prior use of Comus‘s food are not matters of concern. The food offered by Satan is 
linked to idolatry, Lewalski maintains, precisely because ―this is the Devil‘s table, Paul‘s 
symbol for the apex of idolatry in I Corinthians X:21, ‗Yee cannot drinke the cup of the 
Lord, and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lords Table, and of the table 
of devils‘‖ (Milton’s 203-04). This reading stretches the sense of 1 Corinthians 10.21,74 
but Lewalski‘s basic claim aptly highlights what is really at issue in the temptation: 
Christ rejects the feast ―simply on the basis of the giver‖ (Lewalski, Milton’s 217), 
                                                                                                                                                
10.25-30; 8.4-13). Since there is no one else present at Christ‘s temptation, this consideration would not 
seem to apply. Thus, there is little reason to believe that Satan‘s feast has been literally sacrificed to idols 
or that Jesus would know it if it had been, and it appears that Jesus would not necessarily need to refuse 
the feast on those grounds, even if he did know that this were the case.   
73
 See, for example, Romans 14.13-23; 1 Corinthians 8.1-13; 10.23-33. 
74
 The problem with this interpretation of Satan‘s feast is that, in context, Paul seems to imply that food 
would be the ―the table of devils‖ (1 Corinthians 10.21, qtd. in Lewalski 204) because it had previously 
been sacrificed to (demon-supported) idols (1 Corinthians 10.19-20). He simply is not discussing whether 
a feast actually offered by Satan would, as a matter of course, be idolatrous.  
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because it is ―the Devil‘s table‖ (Lewalski, Milton’s 203; ―Milton‖ 224; cf. Kean 436).75 
As already noted, Jesus cites neither unclean foods nor idolatrous associations to explain 
his refusal. Instead, recalling the Lady‘s sentiment that ―none / But such as are good men 
can give good things‖ (Mask 702-03), Christ says that he will partake only ―thereafter as 
[he] like[s] the giver‖ (PR 2.321-22). Even in addressing the issue of gluttony, he rejects 
not these fancy dishes but ―thy‖—that is, Satan‘s—―pompous Delicacies‖ (PR 2.390). 
Beyond the quantity, quality, and past use of the feast, the deciding factor for Jesus is the 
identity and disposition of the one who offers it.
76
 
Since Jesus is admittedly hungry and since he implies that he does have a right to 
make use of Nature‘s goods (PR 2.252; 2.379-82), one might wonder why it matters so 
much who offers him this sustenance. Tellingly, Milton puts this very question in 
Satan‘s mouth. Anticipating that Jesus will not be fooled by his half-hearted claim that 
the feast is ―Not proffer‘d by an Enemy‖ (PR 2.330), Satan asks, ―[W]ho / Would 
scruple‖ to receive food from an enemy when ―with want opprest?‖ (PR 2.330-31). The 
answer may not be immediately apparent, but the fact that the Tempter himself raises 
this question suggests its importance. In the context of Jesus‘s other trials, accepting 
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 Kean similarly comments, ―This is a dietary ethic where one is defined not just by what one eats but by 
those from whom one is willing to take subsistence‖ (436). It should be noted that Lewalski goes on to 
connect the giver with idolatry (Milton’s 217) in the way argued against the previous footnote.  In her 
study of ―Milton and Idolatry,‖ Lewalski similarly maintains that Jesus rejects Satan‘s offers because 
accepting them ―as indispensable to the good life or to the achievement of his own role. . . could 
potentially make idols of them and him that gave them—in this case, Satan.‖ (―Milton‖ 224, emphasis 
mine). Stanley Fish makes a relevant claim when he argues that ―Christ continually rejects [Satan‘s 
offered goods] as they are offered, while being very careful not to condemn them altogether and thus make 
them, rather than an interior disposition, the source of evil‖ (Fish, ―Things‖ 175). As will be seen, the 
giver is one of the primary criteria by which the gifts are judged ―as they are offered,‖ although Fish is not 
primarily interested in this element of the equation (Fish, ―Things‖ 175).  
76
 Medine notes that gifts and gratitude were both traditionally valued more for the disposition of the 
giver/recipient than for the actual value of the gift or thanks (120). As an evil benefactor, Satan causes a 
perversion of this relationship.  
 65 
provision from Satan may be problematic partly because it would imply distrust of the 
Father (cf. Lewalski, Milton’s 215, 203). It may also give Satan undue ―influence‖ (Kean 
440). However, turning to A Mask reveals an additional explanation, relevant for all 
humans but particularly important in view of Satan‘s opposition to Jesus as the Son of 
God. In A Mask, the bestial debasement of Comus‘s followers vividly illustrates why the 
Lady must refuse his offerings (Mask 65-77). Partaking of Comus‘s fare would put her 
under his power—or worse, rather, since Comus himself seems to be ruled by his 
appetites. In view of the multiple parallels between A Mask and this scene of Milton‘s 
brief epic, it seems likely that Satan‘s gifts similarly threaten to put Christ under his 
power. As Satan‘s gifts, the foods at the banquet threaten to create a debt of gratitude to 
him, idolatrously reorienting Jesus‘s God-ward gratitude.  
Both in the banquet scene and later in Paradise Regained, ample evidence 
supports the view that Satan‘s obsessive desire is to give something to Christ. This is 
particularly evident in Satan‘s repeated, frustrated claim that he has the power and right 
to do so. As noted above, Christ explicitly objects to Satan as an unacceptable ―giver‖ in 
the banquet scene (PR 2.321). Significantly, it is not until Jesus has thoroughly rejected 
the offered food that Satan makes an extended case for his authority as a giver. Though 
Satan briefly defends his gift and himself early in the temptation (PR 2.27-31), he is 
initially more interested in redirecting Jesus‘s attention toward a different giver. Nature, 
Satan claims, is dutifully offering her goods to ―her lord‖ (PR 2.335, 332-36, 369-76); 
indeed, charity demands that Jesus accept her humble tribute. Nevertheless, Jesus does 
not lose sight of the fact that that, ―[t]hough Satan presents it as nature's free offering, 
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this banquet is in fact the Devil's table‖ (Lewalski, ―Milton‖ 224). The Son continues to 
focus on Satan‘s attempt to be his giver and ―refuses [the banquet] simply as from that 
source‖ (Lewalski ―Milton‖ 224). Unwilling to ―receive by gift what‖ is his by right (PR 
2.382), Jesus recognizes that ―thy‖—again, Satan‘s—―specious gifts‖ are ―no gifts but 
guiles‖ (2.391). Like Comus‘s ―lickerish baits fit to ensnare a brute‖ (Mask 700), Satan‘s 
offerings are not what they seem. Only after Christ has thus rejected his gift and 
repeatedly drawn attention to his attempt to be a benefactor does Satan make a fuller 
argument for his ―power to give‖ (PR 3.393, 394-402). Since the tempting feast vanishes 
immediately following this tirade (PR 3.403-405), it seems clear that Satan‘s defense is 
more of a rant than anything else; he does not seriously expect Jesus to buy his argument 
and accept him as a benefactor.  
A similar pattern emerges later in Paradise Regained, during the long kingdoms 
temptation. Almost in passing, Satan claims to have ―power‖ to give when he first offers 
Rome to Christ (PR 4.103-4). However, he does not develop this argument until later, 
when he is demanding that the Son worship him in exchange for the kingdoms of this 
world (PR 4.154-69). As Lewalski has noted, it is already apparent by this point that 
Jesus will reject the proposal: ―after Christ has categorically refused the kingdoms 
offered apparently as a free gift,‖ surely ―Satan can hardly expect him to accept a new 
offer of them with the price tag of idolatry boldly attached‖ (Milton’s 260; cf. 280). 
Again, Satan‘s transparency comes as the fruit of despair. Being Christ‘s benefactor is 
his secret aim, revealed only in moments of honest frustration over the failure of more 
appealing temptations.  
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Satan‘s efforts to give Christ something touch on the heart of his manipulation of 
adiaphora in Paradise Regained. Ever since his rebellion in Paradise Lost, Satan has 
resented the unending debt of gratitude that renders him beholden to the exalted Son of 
God, who had a hand in his creation and to whom he therefore owes thanks for the gift 
of existence (PL 5.831-45; cf. Medine, 140-01, passim). As will be further discussed 
below, Satan in Paradise Regained still resents the Father‘s claim to glory (PR 3.108-
120), and presumably he remains at least equally bitter about the exaltation of the Son. 
Before Satan even begins to tempt Christ, his comments in the demonic council attest to 
his fear that this Son of God may somehow be the same Son of God whom he earlier 
opposed, the mighty Son who drove Satan and his demons out of heaven (PR 1.89-93). 
Though outwardly various, Satan‘s many ―gifts‖ are all an attempt to invert the power 
relations against which he rebelled in Paradise Lost, efforts to trick the Son of God into 
incurring a debt of gratitude to him. The temptations to abuse adiaphora are, in other 
words, Satan‘s attempt to regain something of what he lost in Milton‘s earlier epic.  
5.4 Riches and Rule: “Necessary” Adiaphora and Superstitious Idolatry  
Satan‘s offers contain a more or less explicit temptation to use adiaphora as 
though using (or not using) them were necessary in itself. Following Fullwood‘s 
terminology, this is a temptation to superstition: if adiaphora are ―imposed as if they 
were in themselves necessary‖ they become ―Superstition‖ (46). It is also a temptation to 
idolatry, as Milton suggests in his description of ecclesiastical adiaphora in Of 
Reformation (876; cf. Fish, How Milton, passim). This underlying lure to superstitious 
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idolatry runs  throughout Satan‘s temptations, but the offer of riches and earthly rule 
provides a convenient example.
77
  
After Jesus has resisted both food temptations, Satan attributes his ―temperance 
invincible‖ to a commitment to a higher purpose (PR 2.408). Shifting his strategy 
accordingly, Satan frames the rest of the adiaphora he offers as necessary for the 
achievement of Jesus‘s mission, as defined by the rule of charity and Biblical 
prophecies. ―Great acts,‖ Satan reasons, ―require great means of enterprise‖ (PR 
2.412)—means such as money, which can buy worldly power. To the contrary, however, 
Jesus tells Satan,  
Riches are needless . . .  both for themselves,  
And for thy reason why they should be sought,  
To gain a Scepter, oftest better miss‘t. (PR 2.484-86)  
Commenting on these lines, Fish emphasizes ―the precision with which riches are 
pushed away but not condemned altogether‖ (How Milton 54-55). While Jesus‘s ―thy‖ 
implies that there might be other reasons for which riches could be righteously used, 
riches ―are not to be sought ‗for themselves,‘ as a supreme value‖ (Fish, How Milton 
54).  
Fish‘s analysis helps clarify the reason why accepting Satan‘s gifts would result 
in both superstition and idolatry. It would amount to a superstitious affirmation that 
using these indifferent things is necessary, as Satan implies. At the same time, it would 
also be doubly idolatrous. Taking Satan up on his offer would put Jesus in a debt of 
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 Fish places considerable emphasis on this component of adiaphorism in his reading of Paradise 
Regained (How Milton 349-90). 
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gratitude to him, while also tacitly privileging the offered adiaphora above Jesus‘s 
reliance on the Father. As Fish explains, ―anything sought for itself is a false God and . . 
. the reason for seeking it—whether it be material comfort, political power, social 
welfare, or even love—is always a bad reason‖ (How Milton 55, emphasis mine).78 Of 
course, the difficulty is that Jesus must resist not only Satan‘s suggestion that various 
adiaphora are necessary to used but also the contrary assumption that the proffered 
adiaphora are necessarily evil (Fish How Milton 365), lest he fall into the sort of passive 
superstition demonstrated by the immobilized Lady in A Mask.  
5.5 The Glory Debate: God-ward Gratitude Vindicated  
Since Jesus frequently uses the requirement of gratitude to discredit Satan‘s 
claims about ―necessary‖ adiaphora, it is perhaps unsurprising that Satan falls to directly 
attacking gratitude in the debate about glory that opens Book 3. Of course, he does not 
bluntly begin with an assault on gratitude and glory; Satan starts with a pretended appeal 
to charity, craftily building off of Jesus‘s stunning rejection of his earlier offer of riches 
and worldly rule (PR 2.484-86, 3.1-6). Jesus had commented that being a king is more 
difficult than Satan implied: ―the office of a King‖ lies mainly in bearing ―each mans 
burden,‖ for the sake of ―the Publick‖ (PR 2.465, 463). In other words, kingship, like 
everything else, must be used charitably if it is to be used well. Taking his cue from 
Jesus‘s response, Satan weaves the rule of charity into his next temptation. He 
commends the Son for his ―large heart‖ that ―[c]onteins of good, wise, just, the perfect 
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 See also Lewalski Milton’s 280; ―Milton‖ 224. Fish aptly comments that ―there is only one good reason 
for positively valuing created things: as either a manifestation of the creator‘s goodness and glory or as 
part of a response to the creator‘s goodness and glory. Any other reason is a bad reason—an idolatrous 
reason. . . ‖ (How Milton 55).  
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shape‖ (PR 3.11, 10)—and then he accuses Jesus of being unloving by keeping this 
greatness to himself (3.21; cf. Stein 91; Fish How Milton 332). In a reworking of the 
more sexualized carpe diem rhetoric that Comus uses against the Lady, Satan claims that 
Jesus‘s reclusiveness uncharitably ―deprive[s] / All earth‖ of the ―wonder‖ that his deeds 
would inspire, while also preventing Christ from receiving his fair share of ―fame and 
glory‖ (PR 3.23-25). 
After setting up the temptation as a fulfillment of the rule of charity, Satan 
focuses on perverting the requirement of glory or gratitude. Rather than seeking the 
Father‘s glory in the use of adiaphora, Satan wants Jesus to seek his own glory. In 
language reminiscent of Milton‘s earlier poem, ―Lycidas‖ (Flannagan 751, n2), Satan 
exalts glory as the highest end, ―the reward / That sole excites‖ the purest souls—even 
those ―who all pleasures else despise, / All treasures and all gain esteem as dross‖ (PR 
26, 27-28).
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 In case this positive appeal fails, Satan adds a guilt-trip, again appealing to 
self-love and the carpe diem philosophy of Comus.
80
 Jesus‘s ―years are ripe, and over-
ripe‖ for achieving glory, Satan says (PR 3.31). Nevertheless, like the Lady who is ―but 
young yet‖ (Mask 755), Jesus still has time to repent of his ―[i]nglorious‖ ways (PR 
3.42). Just as Comus tells the Lady that there is no time like the present to put her 
youthful body to its proper use, so Satan assures Jesus that he is ―yet . . .  not too late‖ 
for glory (PR 3.42; Mask 737-55).  
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 Of course, for Milton‘s reader, the echo of Philippians 3.8 underscores the perversity of Satan‘s appeal; 
he asks Christ to place glory on par with the Apostle Paul‘s valuation of knowing Christ: ―Yea doubtless, 
and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord: for whom I 
have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ‖ (Philippians 3.8). 
80
 For example, Mask 737-755 and 679-691. Comus‘s carpe diem rhetoric has often been noted; see, for 
example, Guibbory (77) and Marcus (―John‖ 240).  
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Christ responds by reframing the discussion in more abstract terms, as a debate 
about the nature of true glory.
81
 Through a series of oppositions, he deconstructs Satan‘s 
temptation, showing the vanity of the popular military glory that the Tempter espouses. 
Satan‘s version of glory depends on the fickle opinions of the ignorant people, who often 
laud deeds ―scarce worth the praise‖ (PR 3.51). The deeds that win this dubious 
approbation, Jesus implies, are characterized by ―ambition, war, or violence‖ and 
motivated by a thirst for personal fame (3.90, 100-06). Instead, he maintains, ―true glory 
and renown‖ come from God (PR 3.60), as a reward for ―deeds of peace‖ marked by 
wisdom, patience, and temperance (3.91-92)—deeds done because they are just, rather 
than merely to earn glory (3.100-07). As Fish argues, Jesus‘s analysis of the value of 
glory confirms its indifference: if ―embraced as the ‗highest‘ or ‗prime end,‘ it becomes 
an idol, and . . . must be rejected,‖ whereas when glory ―is something that happens to a 
man rather than something he actively seeks, [it] can be accepted not as the reward of 
virtue but as its accidental by-product‖ (How Milton 378). 
Satan takes full advantage of Jesus‘s definition of glory, but before examining his 
response and its relevance for gratitude and adiaphora in Paradise Regained, it is worth 
pausing over the worldly rulers whose fame Christ denigrates. They are conquerors of 
others who remain enslaved by their own licentious appetites and who are subject, 
ultimately, to death (PR 3.85-87). Nevertheless, they set themselves up as ―Gods, / 
―Great Benefactors of mankind‖ (PR 3.81-82). As self-styled benefactors, the idolatrous 
worship that they demand presumably includes thanksgiving, but there is no sign that 
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Barbara Lewalski also briefly comments on the reconceptualization of glory in Paradise Regained her 
article on Milton‘s use of ―Genre‖ (17, 18).  
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these rulers themselves thank God for their victories or for the pleasures they pursue as 
they ―[r]owl in brutish vices‖ (PR 3.86).82 Like Satan, the conquerors are guilty of not 
only ingratitude but also self-idolatry, and they lead others into idolatry as well. Failing 
to fulfill the requirement of gratitude in multiple ways, they cannot use adiaphora 
properly at all. In rejecting these rulers and their practices, then, Christ clearly 
dissociates himself from licentiousness and the idolatry that it breeds. Less obviously, 
this move also aligns him with Stoicism. As Barbara Lewalski explains,  
Christ‘s evaluation of glory . . . is evidently closely patterned on those 
Stoic-Christian texts in which Alexander, Caesar, Scipio, and Pompey 
served as illustrations of the false renown conferred by the multitude, the 
false glory attending upon military conquest for world dominion, and the 
impiety of seeking divine honors. (Milton’s 239)  
In fact, as Satan‘s introduction to this temptation implies, it appears that Jesus has been 
behaving much as one might expect a Stoic to behave, with seeming adherence to 
classical contemptus mundi in his rejection of ―all pleasures‖ and his devaluation of 
―[a]ll treasures and all gain‖ (PR 3.28-29; Lewalski Milton’s 245; cf. Fish, How Milton 
13, passim). This is important to note because, already, Satan is laying the groundwork 
for the learning temptation that is yet to come—although, as will be seen below, he will 
again be disappointed when Jesus shows just how far he is far from classical Stoicism 
and from superstitious, stoical ingratitude.  
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 It is not even clear that they thank other gods; ―[o]ne is the Son of Jove, of Mars the other‖ (3.84), but 
the focus of the worship seems to be on the conquerors, rather than their purported fathers. It is interesting 
to note that Milton uses the same verb to describe their brutish indulgence and that of Comus‘s followers, 
who ―roule with pleasure in a sensual stie‖ (Mask 77). 
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In the glory temptation itself, however, the debate takes a different turn, as Satan 
lashes out over Christ‘s final comment on true glory—―I seek not mine [own glory], but 
his / Who sent me, and thereby witness whence I am‖ (PR 3.106-07). Differentiating 
himself from Satan and all of the self-worshipping conquerors of this world, Christ‘s 
comment at once affirms his submission to the Father and suggests his divinity through 
the closing ―I am‖ statement.83 Moreover, Jesus not only rebuffs Satan‘s offer but, 
knowingly or not, dredges up the Adversary‘s bitter memories of the angelic fall, itself a 
direct response to the Father‘s command that all should glorify the Son (PL 5.772-802, 
853-71).  
Unable to contain himself, Satan ―murmur[s]‖ a bitter reply (PR 3.108; cf. 
Flannagan 754, n.17). He at first tries to continue the temptation of Christ, insinuating 
that his failure to seek glory casts doubt upon Jesus‘s claim to be the Son of God (PR 
3.109-11; Lewalski, Milton 221, 247). However, reflecting his personal obsession with 
questions of divine right and creaturely obligation, Satan‘s argument quickly devolves 
into an attack on the Father‘s demand for glory. In what is essentially a sophisticated 
temptation to distrust, Satan appropriates Christ‘s description of true and false glory and 
attempts to show, point by point, that the Father‘s glory—so essential to Jesus‘s 
conception of proper use—is no glory at all, even by the Son‘s own standards.  
Jesus first objected to Satan‘s proffered glory on the grounds that it comes from 
the ignorant masses (PR 3.47-56). Tacitly accepting the critique, Satan argues that the 
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 The concluding ―I am‖ statement may be suggest deity, as Ricciardi has noted with reference to another 
instance in Paradise Regained (66-67, cf. 188). It is of course outside the scope of this paper to analyze in 
detail exactly what such a claim would mean within Milton‘s somewhat unorthodox Christology.  
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Father himself is similarly indiscriminate. He demands ―Glory from men, all men good 
or bad, / Wise or unwise‖ (PR 3.115-16; emphasis mine). This raises additional 
problems in light of Jesus‘s claim that true glory is won ―[b]y deeds of peace, by wisdom 
eminent, / By patience, temperance‖ (PR 3.91-92). As Satan sees it, the Father‘s glory-
hunger appears both intemperate and violent: ―glory he receives / Promiscuous from all 
Nations,‖ even ―exact[ing]‖ glory from ―his foes pronounc‘t‖ (PR 3.119, 121 754, 
emphasis mine). Most significant of all, Satan also picks up on Jesus‘s qualification 
about motive. Jesus specifically stated that  
if for fame and glory aught be done,  
Aught suffer‘d . . .  
The deed becomes unprais‘d . . . (PR 3.100-02, 104). 
At least, the one who does it loses personal glory (PR 3.103-04). Satan, again ostensibly 
conceding the point, objects that the Father ―seeks glory, / And for his glory all things 
made‖ and maintains (PR 3.110-12). Jesus‘s own criteria for true glory seem to 
undermine the creator‘s right to creation‘s praise, apparently supporting Satan‘s 
rebellious resentment over his creaturely debt of gratitude (PL 4.42-57; qtd. in Medine 
140-41). Indeed, Satan even obliquely references the angelic revolt when he complains 
of the Father‘s demand for glory from all and sundry, ―exact[ing]‖ glory even the 
demons, ―his foes pronunc‘t‖ (PR 3.121).  
When Satan finishes his tirade, Jesus ―fervently‖ corrects his half-truths (PR 
3.121). Tackling the most fundamental issue first, Christ affirms that the Father‘s role as 
creator does give him the right to demand glory from ―every soul‖ (PR 3.125). The 
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creator‘s status simply is different from that of created humans (and presumably created 
angels, too). After all, mere creatures ―of [their] own / Ha[ve] nothing‖—nothing, that is, 
except ―condemnation, ignominy, and shame‖ (PR 3.134-36). Of course, these sad 
possessions are the result of the Fall; they are not the direct product of creation.
84
  
Rather than mere glory-hunting on God‘s part, Jesus portrays creation as an 
unequivocal blessing for creatures, intended  
to shew forth [the Father‘s] goodness, and impart  
His good communicable to every soul  
 Freely. . .  (PR 3.123-25).  
This brief statement undercuts several of Satan‘s chief grounds for complaint. Unlike 
earthly conquerors who vanquish others and then force their captives to worship them, 
the Father‘s expectation of glory comes after he has first blessed his creatures—and that 
with the considerable gifts of existence and (in the case of rational souls) the opportunity 
to participate in his goodness. What Satan views as an intemperate desire for glory from 
all is, in the Son‘s account, simply a reasonable expectation that creatures will make 
grateful return for these gifts, using all adiaphora to the glory of the God who gave 
them. Indeed, since God‘s creatures have nothing else to give him, allowing them to 
make this return through grateful use can even be seen as a way of dignifying them 
(Medine 122).  
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 Fish offers a different perspective on Jesus‘s defense of the Father‘s right to glory. In Fish‘s view, God 
is ―[t]he model‖ for the Son‘s prescription for human glory: just as humans only acquire real glory if it 
―simply befalls‖ them while they are ―act[ing] in a higher service,‖ so also, Fish argues, God‘s glory ―is 
incidental to his action,‖ rather than the motivation of his action (How Milton 377). However, this view 
does not address the clear distinction the Son draws between fallen creatures and the Creator in this 
passage.  
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Besides, Jesus reasons, ―glory and benediction‖ are nothing else but ―thanks, / 
The slightest, easiest, readiest recompence‖ (PR 3.127-28)—hardly an onerous burden, 
as Satan himself admits in a moment of solitude in Paradise Lost (PL 4.41-57). When 
Jesus further argues that creatures unoccupied with thanksgiving ―would likeliest render 
/ Contempt instead,‖ he has hit on a key element of Satan‘s rebellion, in which Satan and 
his rebels abused the indifferent gift of existence by refusing to use it to the glory of the 
Son. Whether or not Milton‘s Jesus has direct knowledge of that event, he clearly is 
aware of the central role that ingratitude played in humanity‘s Fall, and his retrospective 
judgment echoes the Father‘s prediction in Paradise Lost: sinful man is fundamentally 
an ―ingrate‖ (PR 3.139; PL 3.97; Medine 140)—―despoil‘d,‖ in part, by Satan himself 
(PR 3.320).  
Jesus concludes with a comparison that underscores again how wrongheaded 
Satan‘s notions of God are. The ingratitude of humanity led to the loss ―of all true 
good,‖  yet God is so full of ―bounty‖ and ―grace‖—so contrary to the usurious miser 
that Satan envisions
85—that ―he himself to glory will advance‖ those creatures who 
rightly seek his glory, ―not thir own‖ (PR 3.139, 142-44). Of course, such a contrast 
between divine blessing and punishment cannot but rankle with Satan, who is 
dumbstruck ―[w]ith the guilt of his own sin‖ (PR 3.147). As the narrator is careful to 
explain, ―he himself / Insatiable for glory had lost all‖ (3.148).  
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 It is interesting to observe that Satan‘s view of God as a miserly, usurious lender of good recalls the 
perspective of the unfaithful steward in the parable of the talents (Matthew 25.14-30), which Flannagan 
notes has been studied by Dayton Haskin as an influence on ―Milton‘s spiritual autobiography‖ 
(Flannagan 85). See also Donnelly, passim.  
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Clearly, Jesus‘s speech hits a nerve, and its force may be compounded by one 
additional detail in his retort. Although Christ is primarily intending to affirm the 
Father‘s right to glory based on his role as creator, the language of his defense also 
gestures toward the role of the Son in creation: the Father‘s ―word all things produc‘d‖ 
(PR 3.122, emphasis mine). Medine‘s observation about a similar use of ―word‖ in 
Paradise Lost also applies here; Christ ―invokes the scriptural tradition of the Son as the 
creative word, by whom ‗the mighty Father made / All things, ev‘n‘‖ Satan, in his 
former glory (Medine 142; PL 5.836-37). Of course, as has been mentioned, Satan 
―flatly den[ies] the angels‘ status as creatures of God‖ in Paradise Lost (Medine 142), 
claiming self-creation to avoid admitting that he owes obedience and glory (or gratitude) 
to the Father and his exalted Son (PL 5.35-39, PL 5.860; Schoenfeldt 375; Medine 141-
43).
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 Faced with Jesus‘s articulate and well-supported explanation of the Father‘s (and, 
implicitly, the Son‘s) rights over creation, it is no wonder that Satan again becomes 
speechless (PR 3.145-46). The swiftness with which he changes the subject (PR 3.149) 
confirms that Christ‘s rebuttal has hit close to home.  
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 It might be argued that Jesus‘s own submission to the Father in Paradise Regained may reflect not only 
the orthodox idea of kenosis—―[t]he self-renunciation of the divine nature, at least in part, by Christ in the 
incarnation‖ (―Kenosis‖)—but also Milton‘s personal Christology, which is commonly taken as 
subordinationist, based particularly on certain passages of De Doctrina Christiana (e.g., De Doctrina 206, 
215). As McColley explains with reference to Paradise Lost, ―By accepting creature hood—refusal to do 
which is Satan‘s first sin—the Son has become worthy of his pre-eminence and able to be both the agent 
of the creation already prophesied and the redeemer of it after the Fall‖ (171). See also Lehnhof (passim) 
regarding Milton‘s view of deity and creation.   
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5.6 The Kingdoms Temptation: Gratitude and the Interpretation of Scripture and 
Charity 
Satan‘s next lure, the kingdoms of this world, also fails—unsurprisingly. After 
all, Milton‘s Jesus has already eschewed kingship in the abstract when rejecting riches 
(PR 2.484-86). This second temptation to political power, however, is somewhat 
different. Most obviously, it is different because Satan gives extensive detail about the 
force and luxury of the offered kingdoms, perhaps another attempt to encourage 
licentiousness. For present purposes, though, a much more important difference is that in 
this set of temptations Satan repeatedly builds his appeals on the false claim that 
accepting his gifts will uniquely enable Jesus to fulfill the law of charity and/or the 
prophecies of Scripture, the external version of the rule of faith.  
As will be seen in more detail below, Jesus is able to refute Satan on both counts, 
largely by testing every proposed use of an adiaphoron against the requirement of 
gratitude. In keeping with the view of Scripture that Milton proposes elsewhere,
87
 Jesus 
internalizes the rule of faith, making clear that what guides his use of adiaphora is his 
inner conviction of how and when the Father wants him to act out the external 
Scripture‘s prophecies about his Messianic reign. This reign will be experienced as 
charity, Jesus implies, only by those who themselves abide by the criteria of proper 
use—particularly the requirement of gratitude—because only such inwardly reformed 
humans can properly receive Christian liberty. In contrast, the would-be recipients of the 
charitable deeds proposed by Satan are enslaved by idolatry or ungrateful licentiousness, 
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 See, for example, De Doctrina 587; cf. Fish, How Milton 71, passim. 
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confirming that it would not (yet) be right to use the means Satan proposes for their 
deliverance. The requirement of properly oriented gratitude thus proves key, again, to 
discerning distortions of the other criteria for right use. 
The first example of this sort of exchange immediately follows the glory 
temptation. Even if Jesus does not want to pursue glory, Satan reasons, he has already 
been ―ordain‘d‖ to reign as the Davidic king (PR 3.152). To that end, it is necessary that 
Jesus free Israel from the ―Roman yoke‖  so that he will be able to rule over his people 
(PR 3.168). Satan has three reasons for suggesting this, corresponding to the three 
criteria for proper use of things indifferent. Jesus should free Israel from Rome for the 
sake of his ―Zeal of [his] Fathers house‖ (God‘s glory), out of concern for his ―Duty to 
free / [his] country from her Heathen servitude‖ (charity), and as a means to ensure the 
fulfillment of Scriptural prophecies about Jesus‘s ―endless raign‖ ([external] rule of 
faith) (PR 3.175-78).  
Jesus addresses charity and gratitude more directly later in this temptation 
sequence, but his immediate reply focuses on Satan‘s distortion of the letter of Scripture, 
the external counterpart to the internal Scripture on which the law of faith is based.
88
 
Reflecting Milton‘s view of the external Scripture as adiaphora, to be interpreted and 
even overruled by the Scripture written on believers‘ hearts (De Doctrina 587-90), Jesus 
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 As Fish comments with reference to a later passage in Paradise Regained, the fact that ―the devil can 
also quote Scripture . . . means . . .  that Scripture, like anything else, can be perverted to a bad use‖ (How 
Milton 384). For Milton, Fish explains, ―[i]t is not the Scriptures but the Scriptures as they are filled with 
the spirit of God that are sacred; read in the absence of that spirit, by a (literally) unfaithful interpreter, 
they become dead letters‖ (How Milton 384). 
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replies to Satan by rejecting his reading of Biblical prophecies.
89
 In fact, Satan‘s 
misinterpretation is one that Milton‘s Jesus considered and rejected before beginning his 
desert sojourn. Earlier in Paradise Regained, Jesus remembers how, as a child, he had a 
mind ―[s]erious to learn and know, and thence to do / What might be publick good‖ (PR 
1.203-04). His heart hoped to do ―heroic acts,‖ but it took some thinking before Jesus 
figured out which sort of acts would be best. At first, he wanted  
To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke,  
Then to subdue and quell o‘re all the hearth  
Brute violence and the proud Tyrannick pow‘r,  
Till truth were freed, and equity restor‘d (PR 1.217-20).  
This is very much what Satan has in mind; indeed there is even a verbal connection in 
the references to ―the Roman yoke‖ (PR 1.217; 3.168). However, after Jesus‘s mother 
revealed his divine Father, he returned to the Scripture,  
again revolv‘d   
The Law and Prophets, searching what was writ 
 Concerning the Messiah, to our Scribes 
Known partly, and soon found of whom they spake  
I am. . .  (PR 1.259-63). 
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 Although the internal rule of faith is less prominent in Jesus‘s temptations, it is alluded to several times 
in Paradise Regained. Jesus is led by the Spirit into the desert (PR 1.189), and he describes his own 
mission as initiating a fuller communication of God‘s will: ―God hath now sent his living Oracle / Into the 
World, to teach his final will‖ (1.460-61). Moreover, the Spirit who leads Jesus will now write the 
Scripture on the hearts of believers, imparting to them the internal Scripture that allows for better and 
willing obedience: God ―sends his Spirit of Truth henceforth to dwell / In pious Hearts, an inward Oracle / 
To all truth requisite for men to know‖ (1.462-64).  
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As a result, he came to a new, inward conviction that entirely transformed his conception 
of his earthly mission. Rather than a quick ascent to political power, his  
. . . way must lie   
Through many a hard assay even to the death,  
E‘re [he] the promis‘d Kingdom can attain,  
Or work Redemption for mankind, whose sins  
Full weight must be transferr‘d upon [Christ‘s] head. (PR 1.263-67) 
When Satan urges Jesus to immediately deliver Israel from Rome so as to fulfill the 
prophecies about his reign, Jesus holds fast to this conviction about the nature of his 
mission, privileging the internal rule of faith over what might appear to be the surface 
meaning of the external Scripture (PR 3.188-97).
90
   
 Jesus relies on both the internal rule of faith and the requirement of gratitude in 
his reply to Satan‘s next manipulation of charity, here defined more specifically in terms 
of Jesus‘s aforementioned ―Duty to free / [his] country from her Heathen servitude‖ (PR 
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 This does not stop Satan from making a related argument after showing Jesus some of the empires of 
the world, this time calling Scripture into doubt:  
. . . thy Kingdom though foretold  
By Prophet or by Angel, unless thou  
Endeavor, as thy Father David did,  
Thou never shalt obtain; prediction still  
In all things, and all men, supposes means,  
Without means us‘d, what it predicts revokes. (PR 3.351-56) 
Satan‘s goal is to insinuate that using the adiaphora he offers is necessary for the fulfillment of 
Scripture—another temptation to superstition. However, for Milton‘s readers, the passage may also 
underscore the susceptibility of the external law to manipulation and distortion, since Satan‘s description 
of David‘s rise to the kingship is quite contrary to the Scriptural account. Even after David had himself 
been anointed by a prophet as the next king of Israel (1 Samuel 16), he repeatedly chose not use available 
means to take King Saul‘s life (1 Samuel 24, 26)—despite Saul‘s attempts to kill him (e.g., 1 Samuel 19). 
Instead, David waited to assume kingship until Saul was dead (2 Samuel 1-2). If Satan can so twist 
Scripture as to make David a precedent for seizing kingship by force, this further confirms that even the 
external Scripture is a thing indifferent, susceptible to abuse. Fish notes that, in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, Milton treats the Bible itself as a thing indifferent (Fish 192), rejecting the view of 
―extreme literalist[s]‖ in favor of a charity-based standard (qtd. in Fish 192). 
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3.175-76; cf. Stein 91; Fish, How Milton 332). Even if Jesus manages to attain the 
Davidic throne, Satan argues, he is bound to face interference from the Roman or 
Parthian armies (PR 3.357-62). He ―must make‖ one of the two his ally (3.363); Satan 
suggests the latter, superstitiously telling Jesus that only with Parthia‘s help can he 
achieve the freedom of the ten tribes of Israel, a necessary precondition for meaningful 
rule as the prophesied Davidic king  (PR 3.371-74).  
Jesus‘s response addresses both the alleged necessity of seeking means to fulfill 
prophecy and the proposal that he should charitably deliver Israel right away. Rejecting 
Satan‘s offered means but resisting the temptation to overreact in the opposite direction, 
Jesus affirms that he will appropriately ―endeavou[r]‖ to gain the kingdom, when his 
time comes (PR 3.399). However, presumably based on his understanding of the 
Messianic prophecies, he trusts that even then he will not need the means that Satan 
offers—―politic maxims‖ and the ―cumbersome / Luggage of war‖ (3.401-02).  
Having avoided both active and passive superstition with regard to the fulfillment 
of prophecy, Jesus next uses the requirement of gratitude to show that Satan‘s appeal to 
charity relies on a false understanding of the rule of love. The Tempter‘s suggestion 
again touches on an interpretive crux that Jesus resolved for himself before the 
temptations began. As seen above, Jesus recalls early in Paradise Regained how he once 
planned to heroically deliver Israel and take over world power, putting down injustice 
and ending oppression (PR 1.217-20). However, he soon realized that it would be even 
better ―first / By winning words to conquer willing hearts‖ (1.220-22)—and then to 
―subdue‖ those who remain ―stubborn‖ (1.226). In other words, the would-be recipients 
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of Christ‘s charity must first be changed within, if they are to receive his rule as love. 
This principle informs Jesus‘s response to Satan‘s suggestion that he immediately free 
Israel. ―As for those captive Tribes,‖ Jesus says, ―themselves were they / Who wrought 
their own captivity,‖ when they turned to idols instead of worshipping only the true God 
(PR 3.414-15, 416). Despite being disciplined with exile, the Israelites continued in 
idolatry, as have their descendents (3.420-26). As a result, Jesus implies, they are not 
only unworthy of deliverance but actually incapable of receiving—using—liberation 
properly (3.427-32). Until God changes their hearts, if they were restored to freedom in 
their land they would likely just return to the idols they worshiped before (3.427-40), 
rather than glorifying God for and with their liberty.  
 Jesus makes a similar point with reference to licentious ingratitude when Satan 
offers him Rome. The Tempter seeks to ensnare Jesus partly by eliciting charity for the 
Roman people. After listing the glories of Rome (PR 4.44-90), Satan contrasts this 
greatness with the character of the current Roman emperor, who is elderly, heirless, and 
evil, hidden away on an island where he is ruled by base passions (4.91-97)—far from 
the ideal ruler that Jesus envisioned earlier in Paradise Regained (2.466-72). With 
Satan‘s help, the Enemy argues, Jesus could oust this vicious absentee ruler, thereby 
liberating the noble Romans, ―[a] victor people‖ (4.103), from the oppression of a 
debauched emperor and his corrupt proxy (4.91-95). With typically Miltonic emphasis 
on the internal, Jesus points out that he could instead bring inward deliverance: Rather 
than dethroning the wicked emperor, he asks, ―what if I withal / Expel a Devil who first 
made him such?‖ (4.28-29). Leaving the emperor to ―Conscience‖ (4.30), however, 
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Jesus focuses most of his reply on the larger question of whether he should deliver the 
Romans at all. They may have been ―a victor people‖ before (4.103, 132), but they are 
―now vile and base, / Deservedly made vassal‖ as a consequence of their failure to rule 
over their own passions (4.132-33). Jesus asks,  
What wise and valiant man would seek to free  
These thus degenerate, by themselves enslav‘d,  
Or could of inward slaves make outward free?‖ (4.144-46)  
Like the idolatrous ten tribes of Israel, in their present state the ungrateful Romans are 
not only unworthy but also incapable of properly using any political freedom that Jesus 
might give them.  
Throughout the kingdoms temptation Jesus resists both active and passive 
superstition by refusing Satan‘s gifts yet affirming his right to what Satan offers. In an 
interesting twist at the end of this temptation sequence, Jesus questions Satan’s right to 
that which he seeks to give away. Reasoning that the Tempter can only offer what has 
been ―giv‘n‖ to him by God—or, more accurately, what God has ―[p]ermitted‖ him to 
temporarily steal (PR 4.182-83)—Jesus marvels aloud at how Satan can be ―so void of 
fear or shame‖ as to offer the kingdoms ―to me the Son of God, / To me my own‖ (PR 
4.190-92). If the Father allowed Satan the kingdoms that the Tempter offers Christ, 
―how fairly is the Giver now / Repaid?‖ (PR 4.187-88). In using adiaphora to tempt 
Jesus, Satan is himself being ungrateful, failing to fulfill the requirement of gratitude. 
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Suggesting growing certainty about his Adversary‘s identity,91 Jesus finds this 
ingratitude unsurprising. In what appears to be an allusion to the angelic rebellion, he 
tells his would-be benefactor, ―[G]ratitude in thee is lost / Long since‖ (PR 4.88-89). 
Soon after, Satan overtly demands worship in exchange for the kingdoms (4.189-90), 
demonstrating that his ingratitude is tied to idolatry and that this was the underlying aim 
of his earlier temptations (Lewalski, Milton’s 280). Such manifest ingratitude and 
idolatry leave Christ with no doubt about his Tempter‘s identity: ―That Evil one, Satan 
for ever damn‘d‖ (PR 3.194).  
5.7 The Learning Temptation: Stoical Ingratitude and Self-Idolatry  
The jig is up, or so it seems. But Satan has another trick up his sleeve. If the Son 
is too sharp to accept his gifts, perhaps Satan can trick him into rejecting the Father‘s 
blessings. This sort of passive superstition would prevent active charity and thanksgiving 
for creation, as seen in the case of the Lady. Moreover, as suggested by Eve‘s perverse 
contemptus mundi, though such stoical ingratitude might look like virtuous self-control, 
it would in fact evince a bitter, ungrateful love for earthly goods (PL 10.966-1019), 
coupled with idolatrous self-reliance (cf. Lewalski, Milton’s 245-47). Jesus refuses to 
worship Satan, explicitly or implicitly, through the abuse of adiaphora, but will he fall 
for Satan‘s own characteristic sins—ingratitude for gifts and improper confidence in 
himself?   
Satan‘s suggestion of stoical ingratitude comes in the midst of the learning 
temptation, a Miltonic interpolation whose full complexity lies outside the scope of this 
                                                 
91
 Jesus seems to have a general idea of his Tempter‘s identity as early as Book 1 (PR 1.355-56), but his 
previous references to Satan‘s identity could apply to any fallen angel.  
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study. On one level, it is about ―the concept of wisdom—whether its substance is natural 
learning or revelation, whether its source is God or man‖ (Lewalski, Milton’s 290).  This 
general concern relates the learning temptation to the question of whom Christ will 
accept as his benefactor; Jesus‘s affirmation of the supremacy and sufficiency of ―Light 
from above, from the fountain of light‖ (PR 4.289) makes clear where he stands. 
However, equally important to the brief epic‘s representation of proper use, giving, and 
thanksgiving is Satan‘s offer (and the Son‘s rejection) of Stoic philosophy. In his litany 
of philosophical schools, Satan mentions Stoicism only in passing, and ―the Stoic 
severe‖ (PR 3.281) sounds much less impressive than Socrates, ―[w]hom well inspir‘d 
the Oracle pronounc‘d / Wisest of men‖ (PR 4.275-76). Nevertheless, in responding to 
this temptation, Christ shifts the emphasis. He dispatches Socrates in a mere two lines 
(PR 4.294-95), while his rejection of Stoicism extends for nine to nineteen lines, 
depending on how broadly one interprets his later remarks (PR 4.300-19).
92
 As Lewalski 
suggests, these differences in Jesus‘s rejection of different philosophical schools raise a 
key interpretive question: Why does ―Christ renounc[e] so categorically all the realms of 
knowledge, sometimes in a tone of matter-of-fact objective analysis, sometimes in a tone 
of harsh denunciation‖ (Milton’s 282-83, emphasis mine)?  
The brief epic‘s concern with the requirement of gratitude helps make sense of 
Christ‘s varied response, at least with reference to his markedly vehement rejection of 
Stoicism. As briefly noted above, Christ appears very much like a Stoic, at least 
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 The first nine lines most clearly refer to Stoicism; the subsequent lines might be taken as referring to 
classical philosophy generally. They clearly at least include Stoicism in their frame of reference, since 
stoicism has been repudiated at length immediately before, and it is possible to interpret the entire passage 
(4.300-19) as referring to Stoicism.  
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superficially. Just as Jesus ―contemn[s]‖ Satan‘s feast and other offerings (PR 2.391, cf. 
3.448), the Stoics purportedly ―contem[n] all  / Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death 
and‖ even ―life‖ itself (PR 4.304-05). As Lewalski observes,  
Christ‘s behavior in totally rejecting all Satan‘s offers, and the terms he 
uses to describe that rejection—his stated ‗aversion‘ to the riches and 
realms (II.457-58), his frequent references to the noted Stoic exemplars of 
temperance and self-conquest, Satan‘s observation that he is ‗unmov‘d‘ 
by hunger—seem to relate Christ to the Stoic wise man in the rigorous 
formulation of that ideal which owes much to Cynic asceticism. (Milton’s 
245) 
Inconspicuously appended to the end of Satan‘s list of philosophical schools, Stoicism is 
a threat precisely because of these parallels (cf. Lewalski, Milton’s 246-47). It represents 
an almost imperceptible, but profoundly significant, deviation from Christ‘s path of 
grateful submission to the Father. Accordingly, drawing attention to what Satan perhaps 
sought to obscure, Jesus‘s extended repudiation of the Stoics highlights how greatly he 
in fact differs from them, with special emphasis on how their attitudes toward adiaphora 
fail to meet the requirement of gratitude and the glorification of God. 
 Both Jesus and the Stoics seem to contemn temporal goods, for instance, but they 
do so for different reasons and to different degrees. In theory, an ideal Stoic contemns 
the world completely, an absolute denial of both the pain and the pleasure brought by 
indifferent earthly things. On one level, this is problematic because it prevents 
thankfulness for blessings. Why would creatures glorify the creator if they do not 
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appreciate creation? Worse still, Jesus‘s comments suggest that Stoics‘ thankless 
repudiation of earthly goods is hypocritical; their ―tedious talk is but vain boast‖ (PR 
4.307). Like Eve‘s false contemptus mundi, Stoics‘ asceticism simply masks a frustrated 
love for earthly goods. Ultimately, they reject these blessings only because they cannot 
always have them on their terms, not because using them would somehow violate the 
guidelines for proper use. In contrast, Jesus never pretends insensitivity to earthly things, 
whether pleasurable or painful. Although he rejects all of Satan‘s gifts, Christ ―does not 
repudiate absolutely any of the goods offered, or deny them to be goods‖ (Lewalski, 
Milton’s 247). As becomes particularly evident in the closing banquet, Jesus remains 
willing to (thankfully) enjoy many of the goods that he refuses to take from Satan, 
provided that they come from the proper Giver (cf. Fish, How Milton 347).
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Jesus and the Stoics also diverge drastically with reference to the source and goal 
of their seemingly similar contempt for the world. Christ has all ―the endurance and self-
conquest of the Stoic moral hero,‖ but this ―self-conquest is not grounded upon his own 
self-sufficiency‖ (Lewalski, Milton’s 246). Instead, as evident in his persistent rejection 
of Satan‘s quick-fix plans, Christ‘s self-governance is based ―upon his trust in God‖ 
(Lewalski, Milton’s 246). He accordingly seeks to obey the Father in each circumstance, 
discerning his will by jointly considering the internal rule of faith, the rule of charity, 
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 More than one scholar has commented on this. Lewalski, for instance, writes,  
Christ‘s victory is proclaimed and celebrated by the angelic host, and, as if in reward, all 
the goods which he refused to receive at Satan‘s hand are given or promised to him in a 
more exalted form—instead of diabolic agents disguised as ministrants of Nature he has 
angelic ministrants, instead of a carnal banquet a heavenly one, instead of satanic 
recognition of his divinity an affirmation by God‘s angelic choir of his divine sonship 
and mediatorial role, instead of a false earthly kingdom an assurance of a true and 
immortal kingdom. (Milton’s 114)  
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and the requirement of gratitude. It is far otherwise with the Stoics. They set themselves 
up as ―all possessing / Equal to God‖ (PR 4.302-03). Moved by ―Philosophic pride,‖ 
they look for virtue merely ―in themselves‖ (PR 4.300, 315). Rather than aligning them 
with Christ, Stoics‘ self-reliance recalls Satan‘s assertion of self-creation in Paradise 
Lost, a form of ingratitude that tends toward self-idolatry. Indeed, the Stoics‘ attitude 
toward glory confirms that their ingratitude has idolatrous implications. While the Son 
seeks the Father‘s glory (PR 3.106-07), Stoics ―to themselves / All glory arrogate, to 
God give none‖ (PR 4.315-16). Beyond failing to thank God, the Stoics go so far as to 
make accusations against him, portraying him as ―regardless quite / Of mortal things‖ 
(PR 4.318-19). This is the very sort of distrust that Satan has been suggesting to Jesus all 
along.  
It is also a claim that seems particularly apt to offend the Son of God incarnate, 
whose hunger pains have already proven him far from ―regardless quite / Of mortal 
things‖ (PR 4.318-19).94 However, Satan is not alone in thinking that Jesus might fall 
prey to stoical ingratitude. Critics commonly read Milton‘s Jesus as ―cold‖ (Flannagan 
712), and some have even claimed that he is a Stoic.
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 Jesus‘s extended rejection of the 
Stoics may be Milton‘s way of emphatically denying such a misreading of Christ‘s 
persistent nay-saying.  
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 Ricciardi offers an extended meditation on the implications of the incarnation in Paradise Regained 
(passim). 
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 Lewalski notes that ―H. J. C. Grierson, E. M. W. Tillyard, and others have ascribed Stoicism to Christ‖ 
(Milton’s 242)—although she does not herself endorse this view (243). More recently, Margaret Kean 
describes Jesus as stoic (442), albeit in passing. 
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5.8 A Balancing Act and a Feast 
In the steeple temptation, Satan again manipulates Scripture, and Jesus again 
resists him.
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 The encounter does not add substantially to the image of proper use 
developed earlier in Paradise Regained. However, Jesus‘s position in this scene does 
memorably capture some of the difficulty involved in properly using adiaphora. As Fish 
comments, Jesus‘s ―station is uneasy because it is precarious; that is, it requires balance. 
It is thus a perfect visual emblem of what has been required of the Son all along‖ (How 
Milton 386-7). In a way, Jesus‘s balancing act corresponds to the children‘s final dance 
in A Mask: it conveys the vigorous effort required for proper use, while also providing 
an image of triumph over temptation.  
Further confirming Jesus‘s conquest over the superstition of stoical ingratitude, 
as well as all other forms of abusing adiaphora, Paradise Regained concludes with a 
licit feast (PR 4.587-593).
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 Recalling the Attendant Spirit‘s blessing of Sabrina (Mask 
922-37), Jesus‘s replenishment is accompanied by angels‘ ―spontaneous hymns of 
thanksgiving‖ (Kean 442; PR 4.593-635; cf. Lewalski, Milton’s 114). Still more clearly, 
their hymn echoes the Attendant Spirit‘s exultant song before the children‘s parents, in 
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Fish points out that Satan‘s appeal to Scripture in the pinnacle scene plays on Jesus‘s practice of having 
recourse to Scripture:  
As recently as line [4.]175, the Son has turned away from a temptation with the formula 
‗It is written,‘ and when Satan appropriates the same formula here he seems to be 
inviting the Son to reaffirm an allegiance he himself has repeatedly proclaimed. This is 
not simply the temptation to presumption (although it is surely that), but the temptation 
of Scripture. (How Milton 384)  
However, as seen above, the same could be said of Satan‘s earlier comments about the need to fulfill 
prophecies regarding the Davidic kingship, which clearly allude to the Scripture. One might even argue 
that Milton‘s Satan‘s manipulation of Scripture in the steeple temptation is less significant than these 
earlier examples, since the Biblical accounts of Jesus‘s temptation record Satan explicitly twisting 
Scripture in the Temple temptation but not in the other two temptations (Matthew 4.6-7; Luke 4.9-12).  
97
 There is some biblical basis for this in Matthew 4.11, but Milton expands greatly upon the biblical hint 
of a feast, and he further emphasizes it by providing a negative counter-feast earlier in the brief epic.  
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celebration of their ―triumph . . . / O’re sensual Folly, and Intemperance‖ (Mask 974-
75). In response to Christ‘s more perfect use of adiaphora, the angels sing ―Heavenly 
Anthems of [Christ‘s] victory / Over temptation, and the Tempter proud‖ (PR 4.594-
95)—glorifying the Son who has faithfully defended the Father‘s right to thanks.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This study began with the question of why Milton would emphasize gratitude, as 
he clearly does in A Mask and Paradise Regained. It is not an idle question since, as 
Achsah Guibbory argues, ―[a]ll of Milton‘s writing was driven by an educative, 
redemptive purpose‖ (73). Why did Milton—why might we—deem gratitude so 
important? The foregoing analysis suggests that at least one answer to this question lies 
in the relationship between gratitude and the proper use of things indifferent.
98
 Indeed, 
Milton not only foregrounds gratitude but also vividly illustrates the consequences of its 
perversion, whether in Comus‘s self-indulgent ingratitude, the Lady‘s stoical ingratitude, 
or Satan‘s attempts to provoke idolatry by giving adiaphora to Jesus. As has been 
shown, these vices are closely allied to the common abuses of the doctrine of things 
indifferent, making gratitude a particularly important criterion for securing the proper 
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 Although gratitude‘s role in adiaphorism seems to be the primary reason for its prominence in Milton‘s 
work, there may be other reasons for its appeal as well.  For example, emphasizing gratitude is consistent 
with Milton‘s tendency to internalize (Keeble 129): he himself categorizes gratitude as part of internal 
worship (De Doctrina 656), and this is consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition surrounding gratitude, 
as summarized by Medine. In the Hebrew Scripture, thanksgiving becomes ―the supreme form of 
sacrifice,‖ thereby ―shift[ing] the sacrificial act from the external to the internal‖ (Medine 128). Later, the 
―essential inwardness of gratitude‖ received further confirmation from Christian theologians such as 
Thomas Aquinas, who ―locat[ed] the source of gratitude within the individual and in his personal 
responses‖ to gifts received (Medine 121). Moreover, as an inward virtue, gratitude not only caters to 
Milton‘s preference for interiorizing but also supports individual freedom and choice. Because gratitude is 
fundamentally an interior disposition, it ―can never be compelled externally‖ (Medine 120), nor can it be 
prevented by external hindrances such as poverty (122). In fact, gratitude is so essentially tied to freedom 
that it is meaningful if—and only if—―experienced and expressed willingly and freely‖ (Medine 120). 
Given Milton‘s known emphasis on free will and the individual‘s control over his or her own spirituality, 
it is unsurprising that such a virtue would appeal to him. As an individualized, internalized virtue, 
gratitude can be practiced by Jesus alone in the desert, by the Lady bereft of her brothers—and presumably 
also by Milton, even when faced with loss of sight, loved-ones, and political hopes. Medine marvels that 
Milton could stay grateful in times of such deep distress (117), yet one might also argue, based on 
Medine‘s own findings, that gratitude should particularly appeal to those who lack the material and social 
resources with which to repay their benefactors. As Medine argues, gratitude is ―empowering‖ even for 
those in dire straits, because the one who gives thanks to God enacts ―a mirror image of God‘s actions 
toward mankind,‖ achieving ―ultimate freedom‖ by becoming ―godly—godlike‖ (122). 
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use of adiaphora. Particularly in Satan‘s attempts to subvert gratitude in Paradise 
Regained, Milton‘s literary representations of gratitude also complicate this seemingly 
straightforward criterion, showing that, like the rules of charity and faith, it requires 
careful interpretation and application. This effort is worthwhile, however, because a well 
developed understanding of the requirement of gratitude enables one to recognize 
ungrateful distortions of the more frequently manipulated criteria of faith and love. Thus, 
in the context of early modern controversies surrounding the use of things indifferent, 
Milton‘s ―remarkable . . . fascination‖ with gratitude (Medine 119) begins to make more 
sense.   
 94 
  WORKS CITED 
 
 
Bagshaw, Edward. The Great Question Concerning Things Indifferent in Religious 
Worship . . . . London, 1660. EEBO. PDF.  
The Bible, King James Version. 1987. BibleGateway.com Web. 20 June 2011.  
www.biblegateway.com/versions/King-James-Version-KJV-Bible/#copy 
Bradshaw, William. A Treatise of the Nature and Use of Things Indifferent . . .  . 
[London?], 1605. EEBO. PDF.  
Brooke, Robert Greville, Baron. A Discourse Opening the Nature of that Episcopacie, 
Which Is Exercised in England. . . . . London, 1641. EEBO. PDF.  
Caldwell, Melissa M. ―Milton, Lord Brooke, and the Value of Adiaphora on the Eve of 
the English Civil War.‖ Seventeenth Century 22.1 (2007): 97-123. PDF.  
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Trans. Henry Beveridge. 1599. Center 
for Reformed Theology and Apologetics. N.d. Web. 21 June 2011.  
Campbell, Gordon, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, David I. Holmes, and Fiona J. 
Tweedie. ―The Provenance of De Doctrina Christiana.‖ Milton Quarterly 31.3 
(1997) 67-117.Web. 25 Sept. 2010.    
Clark, Samuel. Of Scandal: Together with a Consideration of the Nature of Christian 
Liberty and Things Indifferent. . . . London, 1680. EEBO. PDF. 
Dei Segni, Lotario [Pope Innocent III]. De Miseria Condicionis Humane. Ed. Robert E. 
Lewis. Athens: U of Georgia Press, 1978. Print. The Chaucer Library. 
Donnelly, Phillip J. Milton’s Scriptural Reasoning: Narrative and Protestant Toleration. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print.  
 95 
Felch, Susan M. ―The Intertextuality of Comus and Corinthians.‖ Milton Quarterly 27.2 
(1993): 59-70. PDF.  
Fenton, Mary C. ―Hope, Land Ownership, and Milton‘s ‗Paradise Within.‘‖ SEL: 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 43.1 (2003) 151-180. Project Muse. 
Web. 8 Dec. 2010.  
Fish, Stanley. How Milton Works. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard UP,
 2001. Print.  
---. ―Things and Actions Indifferent: The Temptation of Plot in Paradise Regained.‖ 
Milton Studies 17 (1983): 163-85. PDF.  
Flannagan, Roy, ed. The Riverside Milton. John Milton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1998. Print.   
Fullwood, Francis. Some Necessary & Seasonable Cases of Conscience about Things 
Indifferent in Matters of Religion . . . . London, 1661. EEBO. PDF.  
 ―Gratulate.‖ Def. 1. The Oxford English Dictionary. Online Version Nov. 2010. Web. 
10 Dec. 2010. 
―Gratulate.‖ Def. 4. The Oxford English Dictionary. Online Version Nov. 2010. Web. 10  
Dec. 2010. 
Guibbory, Achsah. ―Milton and English Poetry. A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. 
Corns. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 72-89. Print. Blackwell 
Companions to Literature and Culture. 
Hillier, Russell M. ―Milton‘s Paradise Regain’d and Herbert‘s ‗Love [III].‘‖ Explicator 
66.1 (2007): 4-9. PDF.  
 96 
James I, King of England. Basilikon Doron. Devided into Three Bookes. Edinburgh, 
1599. EEBO. PDF.  
James I, King of England. The Kings Majesties Declaration to His Subjects Concerning 
Lawfull Sports to Be Used [Book of Sports]. London, 1618. EEBO. PDF.  
Kahn, Victoria. ―Allegory, the Sublime, and the Rhetoric of Things Indifferent in  
Paradise Lost.‖ Creative Imitation: New Essays on Renaissance Literature in 
Honor of Thomas M.Greene. Ed. David Quint, Margaret W. Ferguson, G. W. 
Pigman, III, and Wayne A. Rebhorn. Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance 
Texts & Studies, 1992. 127-52. PDF. 
---. Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1994. ebrary. Texas A&M Libraries. Web. 20 June 2011. 
site.ebrary.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/lib/tamu/docDetail.action? 
docID=10035817 
---. ―Revising the History of Machiavellism: English Machiavellism and the Doctrine of 
Things Indifferent.‖ Renaissance Quarterly 46.3 (1993): 526-61. JSTOR. PDF.  
Kean, Margaret. ―Paradise Regained.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. Corns. 
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 429-43. Print. Blackwell 
Companions to Literature and Culture. 
Keeble, H. H. ―Milton and Puritanism.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. Corns. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 124-40. Print. Blackwell Companions 
to Literature and Culture.  
―Kenosis.‖ The Oxford English Dictionary. Online Version Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Dec. 
 97 
2010. 
Lehnhof, Kent R. ―Deity and Creation in the Christian Doctrine.‖ Milton Quarterly 35.4 
(2001): 232-44. PDF. 
Lewalski, Barbara K[iefer]. ―Genre.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. Corns. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 3-21. Print.   
---. ―Milton and Idolatry.‖ Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 43.1 (2003): 213-32. 
PDF.   
---. Milton’s Brief Epic: The Genre, Meaning, and Art of Paradise Regained. Providence, 
RI: Brown UP; London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1966. Print. 
Marcus, Leah S. ―John Milton‘s Comus.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. 
Corns. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. Print. 232-60. Blackwell 
Companions to Literature and Culture.  
---. The Politics of Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, and Marvell and the Defense of Old 
Holiday Pastimes. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986. Print.  
McColley, Diana Kelsey. ―Milton and Ecology.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas 
N. Corns. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 157-73. Print. 
Blackwell Companions to Literature and Culture. 
McGuire, Maryann Cale. Milton’s Puritan Masque. Athens: U Georgia P, 1983. Print.  
Medine, Peter E. ―Gratitude and Paradise Lost.‖ Milton and the Grounds of Contention. 
Ed. Mark R. Kelley, Michael Lieb, and John T. Shawcross. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne UP, 2003. 115-49, 300-03. PDF.  
 98 
Milton, John. Areopagitica.. The Riverside Milton. Ed. Roy Flannagan. Boston:
 Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998. 987-1024. Print.  
---. Two Books of Investigations into Christian Doctrine Drawn from the Sacred 
Scriptures Alone (ca. 1658-1660) [De Doctrina Christiana]. Trans. John Carey.
 Complete Prose Works of John Milton (ca. 1658-1660). Vol. 6. New Haven and 
London: Yale UP, 1973. 117-807. Print.  
---. Comus [A Mask]. The Riverside Milton. Ed. Roy Flannagan. Boston: Houghton
 Mifflin Company, 1998. 109-171. Print.  
---. Of Reformation. 1641. The Riverside Milton. Ed. Roy Flannagan. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1998. 873-901. Print.   
---. Paradise Lost.. The Riverside Milton. Ed. Roy Flannagan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1998. 296-710. Print.  
---. Paradise Regained. The Riverside Milton. Ed. Roy Flannagan. Boston: Houghton
 Mifflin Company, 1998. 711-82. Print. 
Racster, John. The True Art of Living Well. The Right Use of Things Indifferent. . . . .
 London, 1605. EEBO. PDF. 
Ricciardi, Marc. John Milton’s Incarnational Poetics: The Roles of Mary and Christ in 
Paradise Regained. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010. Print.    
Rutherford, Samuel. The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication: Or 
a Peaceable Dispute for the Perfection of the Holy Scriptures in Point of 
Ceremonies and Church Government . . . . London, 1646. EEBO. PDF.  
Schoenfeldt, Michael. ―Obedience and Autonomy in Paradise Lost.‖ A Companion to 
 99 
Milton. Ed. Thomas N. Corns. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell  
Publishing. 363-79. Print. Blackwell Companions to Literature and Culture.  
Schwartz, Regina M. ―Milton on the Bible.‖ A Companion to Milton. Ed. Thomas N. 
Corns. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.  37-54. Print. Blackwell 
Companions to Literature and Culture. 
Shagan, Ethan. ―Beyond Good and Evil: Thinking with Moderates in Early Modern
 England.‖ Journal of British Studies 49.3 (2010): 488-513. JSTOR. Web. 2 Aug.
 2011.  
Silver, Victoria. Imperfect Sense: The Predicament of Milton’s Irony. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 2001. NetLibrary. Web. 21 June 2011.  
Stein, Arnold. Heroic Knowledge: An Interpretation of Paradise Regained and Samson 
Agonistes. Minneapolis, Minn.: U of Minnesota P, 1957. Print. 
Tombes, John. Christs Commination against Scandalizers . . . . London, 1641. EEBO. 
PDF.  
Verkamp, Bernard J. The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 
1554. Athens, Ohio: Ohio UP; Wayne State UP, 1977. Print. Studies in the 
Reformation 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
VITA 
 
Julie Nicole Newberry received her Bachelor of Arts degree in English and  
Humanities at Biola University in 2004. She entered the English program at Texas A&M  
University in August 2009 and received her Masters of Arts degree in August 2011. Her 
research interests include early modern devotional literature and age studies. She plans to  
attend seminary and go into ministry with the elderly.  
 Ms. Newberry may be reached through the Department of English, Texas A&M 
University, 227 Blocker Building, Mailstop 4227, TAMU, College Station, TX 77843. 
Her email is julie541@sbcglobal.net.  
 
